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ABSTRACT 
 Incentives are not always economic or monetary in nature. Individuals are often influenced by 
socially-based incentives centered on how he or she wants to be perceived in a social setting, such as the 
desire to publicly adhere to a norm of fairness. Likewise, individuals can also be influenced by cognitively-
based incentives centered on self-perception and self-attribution, such as the desire to convince oneself that 
he or she is altruistic. Behavioral economists have incorporated some of these concepts into standard 
economic models of decision-making, but there is much we still do not understand about the role of these 
psychology-based incentives in organizational strategy and public policy contexts.  
 This thesis examines the effects of several social and cognitive incentives across different settings. 
In Chapter I, I use a laboratory experiment to examine why individuals feel the need to reciprocate to gifts 
and favors, even when those gifts are from businesses looking to take advantage of our tendency to 
reciprocate. Specifically, I demonstrate that individuals reciprocate simply to the intent to give a gift or 
favor, regardless of the ulterior motives or actual utility resulting from the favor. In Chapter II, I use 
observational data to investigate how pharmaceutical firms exploit social incentives that invoke reciprocity 
in order to influence how physicians prescribe. I concurrently examine how regulators also use social 
incentives, but as a way to protect consumers from these manipulative marketing strategies. In Chapter III, I 
collaborate with a non-profit public radio station to test the interaction between psychological and economic 
incentives in a fundraising context. In particular, Chapter III uses a field experiment to show that economic 
incentives in a fundraising campaign can reduce donation rates by detracting attention from the 
psychological reasons for donating, and thereby inducing a different mindset in donors. 
 This thesis builds upon the field of behavioral economics in two ways. First, it uses experimental 
methods to extend our theoretical understanding of non-monetary, psychological incentives, including some 
of the mechanisms that drive reciprocity, social image, and motivation crowding out. Second, the thesis 
applies this knowledge toward understanding the effects of several commonly used marketing campaigns 
and regulatory policies. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
  Social scientists have documented many categories of non-monetary incentives that can influence 
decision-making through psychological mechanisms. These include socially-based incentives that influence 
individuals through how they want their actions to be perceived by others, as well as cognitive-based 
incentives that influence individuals through their desire to perceive themselves in a particular way. For 
instance, individuals may choose to donate to a charity both because they want others to perceive them as 
altruistic (a social incentive), and because they want to perceive themselves as altruistic (a cognitive 
incentive). Both social and cognitive incentives are often based off of commonly held societal norms, such 
as altruism, fairness, trust, reciprocity, and the like (Cialdini 2006). This thesis explores several examples of 
norm-driven psychological incentives, including how they can influence the effectiveness of certain types of 
marketing strategies and regulatory policies. 
  One such psychological incentive is an individual’s desire to reciprocate to a gift or favor. 
Reciprocity refers to our desire to respond to an action with a similar action in kind. Some version of this 
norm has been documented in virtually every culture (Gouldner 1960; Mauss 1950) and may even have 
been evolutionarily selected for (Nesse 2009; Axelrod 1984). Chapter I of this thesis investigates the 
cognitive motives behind an individual’s desire to reciprocate to a gift or favor. In particular, Chapter I tests 
whether individuals care primarily about the intent of the giver, as hypothesized by the economist Matthew 
Rabin (1993), or whether individuals instead care more about maintaining a self-image as a reciprocator. 
This represents the first economic study to actually test whether individuals reciprocate purely to the intent 
to give a gift, independent of any change in actual pay or outcome. In addition, it is the first study to 
simultaneously test whether self-image can motivate reciprocity either independently or in conjunction with 
the perceived intent of the giver. 
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  Reciprocity can be an extremely useful tool for marketers and salespeople (Cialdini 2006). For 
instance, firms often give free gifts and product samples, which can induce consumers to reciprocate with a 
purchase even when the gifts are unrelated to what the consumer ends up purchasing (Beltramini 1992; 
2000). This is particularly evident in the world of pharmaceutical marketing, where pharmaceutical 
salespeople regularly provide free meals, office supplies, and other small gifts to clinicians and their staffs; 
such gifts have been shown to increase the volume of marketed drugs prescribed by these physicians 
(Larkin, Ang, Chao, and Wu 2014). 
  Chapter II examines whether another psychological incentive, concern for one’s public image, can 
mitigate the influence of pharmaceutical marketing on doctors. In 2009, Massachusetts began requiring that 
all free pharmaceutical gifts and meals to doctors be publicly disclosed in a consumer-searchable database. 
Chapter II uses doctor-level prescriptions data on doctors from multiple states to measure how mandated 
disclosure changed prescriptions for Massachusetts doctors; doctors in other states represent the 
counterfactual. Importantly, Chapter II examines changes in prescriptions that occur before patients gained 
access to the disclosures data, and before the pharmaceutical industry made any changes to how they 
marketed to doctors. Thus, any observed changes in prescription patterns would likely be driven by doctor-
level response to disclosure. In particular, if prescriptions of marketed drugs decreased due to disclosure, 
then doctors likely stopped accepting free gifts and meals in order to avoid having anything to disclose. 
According to past research, this change in gifts and meals would likely lead to a decrease in marketed drug 
prescriptions (Larkin et al 2012). This public image mechanism would also be consistent with laboratory 
experiments on mandated disclosures of conflicts-of-interest (Sah and Loewenstein 2014). 
  Non-profits often also use gifts in fundraising campaigns, but gifts can invoke a very different set of 
incentives in this charitable context. Individuals donate to charities for many reasons: to signal to themselves 
that they are charitable, to support a cause they believe in, and so on. Introducing a gift can crowd out these 
intrinsic motives by directing attention away from these reasons for donating. Moreover, the gift can cause 
donors to direct their attention toward whether the gift item is worth the amount they are donating; this shift 
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in attention can therefore cause donors to shift from a communal, pro-social mindset towards an economic, 
transactional mindset, further diluting the emphasis an individual places on their intrinsic motives for 
donating.  
  Chapter III examines whether offering conditional gifts in a fundraising campaign can decrease 
contributions. Chapter III tests for this by collaborating with a public radio station to run a direct-mail field 
experiment on past donors to the station. The experiment implements two treatment conditions and a control 
condition; the control condition solicits donations and offers no gift. In the treatment conditions, donors are 
offered either a gift that benefits themselves (a thermos) or a gift that benefits others (meals to a food bank) 
if they donate above a specified threshold. If the gift reduces donations only through decreasing the self-
signal value of a donation, then only one of the two gift types (the thermos) should decrease donation rates. 
Note that because these gifts are conditional in nature, they do not invoke reciprocity as the gifts in the 
previous Chapters do. Instead, Chapter III investigates whether in this context these conditional gifts can 
invoke a set of cognitive incentives relating to attention, mindset, or self-signaling. 
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
 
For it is in giving that we receive. 
- St. Francis of Assisi 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Advertising Specialty Institute estimates that more than $18.5 billion is spent annually in 
North America on promotional products (ASI 2012), which are often handed out as free gifts to 
prospective consumers. According to the social psychologist Robert Cialdini, this practice profits firms in 
part by inspiring consumers to reciprocate to these gifts. To support this interpretation, Cialdini (2006) 
cites the example of the Hare Krishna. This religious group became infamous in the 1970s and 1980s for 
soliciting in airports by first giving passers-by a flower or candy cane before requesting a donation. This 
strategy proved extremely effective at increasing donations, even though many donors gave grudgingly, 
did not appear to like the solicitor, and subsequently threw the flower into the nearest trash bin.1 
 Reciprocation to gifts in this context seems to run counter to standard economic thinking on 
reciprocity. These models emphasize that reciprocity-based social preferences hinge on the perceived 
intentions of the first-mover (Rabin 1993). However, it is debatable whether consumers would infer kind 
intentions behind a small gift from a salesperson or solicitor; the ulterior selfish motives of the gift should 
be obvious to most individuals and could prevent the gift from being viewed as kindly intended. 
 Alternatively, perhaps individuals simply feel the need to reciprocate in order to preserve their 
self-image (or public image) as someone who returns favors and adheres to the widely accepted norm of 
reciprocity. Anthropologists claim that some form of reciprocity norm inevitably develops in every 
culture (Gouldner 1960), perhaps because it is an evolutionarily favored outcome (Axelrod 1984). Since it 
is such a commonly held norm, individuals may reciprocate to gifts to avoid perceiving oneself as a non-
reciprocator, which may lead to feelings of guilt. Economic models suggest that guilt can motivate 
                                                            
1 Knowing this, the solicitors would periodically check the trash to replenish their supply of flowers (Cialdini 2006). 
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individuals to adhere to commonly held fairness norms (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2004), and it is 
possible that guilt can cause adherence to reciprocity norms as well. If so, then contexts that can increase 
self-reflection or self-image concerns could increase the likelihood of reciprocation.2  
 Existing laboratory studies cannot distinguish between intentions versus self-image motivators of 
reciprocity. Previous studies have only measured reciprocation to intentions when those intentions are 
accompanied by a change in outcome. That is, they always implement an increase (or decrease) in pay 
and then vary whether this increase (or decrease) is due to chance or to an opposing player’s actions (e.g., 
Charness and Rabin 2002; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2008). This design therefore cannot determine if 
individuals are indeed reciprocating to the intention of the giver, or if they are instead reciprocating 
simply because they have received a favor and must maintain their self-image by returning the favor. 
This study uses a simple modified dictator game to test between these motivators of reciprocity. I 
incorporate gift-giving actions into a standard dictator game (i.e., the Dictator Game with Gifts, or DGG). 
The non-dictator is endowed with a small gift that they can give to the dictator to try and influence the 
dictator’s allocation. These gifts can be small or large in value and either monetary or non-monetary (i.e., 
pens or duffel bags) in nature. This setup mimics the ulterior motives behind promotional gifts from 
salespeople. 
The first treatment tests whether intentions alone can motivate reciprocity in this setting. When 
the non-dictator chooses to give a gift, the intention-to-give is announced; however, the experiment varies 
whether the gift is actually allowed to exchange hands. In this way, I can measure whether intentions 
alone are enough to engender reciprocity, as posited by Rabin (1993). This represents the first study to 
test whether intentions can motivate reciprocity independent from a simultaneous change in outcome. 
The second treatment measures whether self-image concerns can motivate reciprocation. This 
treatment increases the saliency of self-image by announcing ex-ante that dictators will see how their 
allocations compare to other dictators’ choices. Subjects will be shown approximately how their 
                                                            
2  Similarly, in more public settings such as the Hare Krishna example, public image concerns could motivate 
reciprocity; after all, social image has been shown to motivate people to adhere to other norms, such as fairness 
(Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) or impure altruism (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2012). 
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allocations compare (via a percentile rank score) to those of their peers, both when they receive a gift and 
when they do not. 3 Since these comparisons are only shown to each dictator individually, only self-image 
(and not public image) concerns are invoked. If individuals fear appearing as non-reciprocators to 
themselves, they should be motivated to reciprocate more upon receiving a gift. 
In all sessions, I control for dictator preferences over wealth distribution. Since gifting an item to 
the dictator changes how wealth is distributed, wealth distributional preferences must be controlled for 
(Charness and Rabin 2002). To accomplish this, I implement control sessions where dictators are 
endowed with a gift item, but from the computer instead of from their partner. Reciprocity can then be 
measured by comparing how dictators allocate when they receive an item from their partner versus when 
they receive the same item from the computer. 
I find that dictators reciprocated positively to gifts from other participants. Dictators allocated on 
average 30% more when they received the item from their partner instead of from the computer. This 
increased to 50% more on average when the gift was a large-value item. In addition, 60% of selfish 
dictators (those that always allocate $0 in rounds where no item is present) allocated a positive amount on 
average when receiving a gift; half of this shift was driven by changes in wealth distribution (i.e., when 
the gift came from the computer), and half was driven by reciprocity to the gift-giver (i.e., when the gift 
was from the other player).  
Dictators also responded very strongly to declared intentions-to-give that resulted in no change in 
wealth distribution. In these instances, average dictator allocations approximately doubled relative to 
rounds with no declared intention-to-give.4 In addition, 22% of selfish dictators allocated positive 
amounts when a gift was attempted, but prevented by the computer. Thus, simply the intent to give a gift 
was enough to engender reciprocity, and higher allocations, in many dictators. 
                                                            
3To avoid feedback and learning effects, subjects are shown these comparisons only at the end of the experiment. 
However, subjects are reminded at the beginning of each round that these comparisons will be made at the end. 
4 In rounds with no declared intention-to-give, dictators did not know if their partner was endowed with a gift or not; 
thus, there was no evidence of any confounding “punishment” effects for not declaring an intention-to-give. 
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Self-image did not seem to motivate reciprocity in this game. The incremental effect of a gift on 
allocation was the same regardless of whether self-image concerns were salient. In addition, there was no 
interaction effect between intentions and self-image; dictators responded to intentions similarly in both 
the self-image and standard treatments. The lack of any interaction between self-image and intentions is 
key; this suggests that dictators are not reciprocating to the intent to give a gift because their self-image 
will suffer if they do not.  
Instead, self-image increased baseline allocations irrespective of gifts. That is, when self-image 
was more salient, dictators allocated more regardless of whether they received a gift or not. This 
experiment therefore finds that self-image may be a motivator of wealth distribution preferences, but that 
an intentions mechanism (and not self-image) is the more likely motivator of reciprocity in this setting. 
This is the first study to directly test these reciprocity mechanisms. Although Rabin’s intentions-
based model was published back in 1993, no subsequent study measured whether people reciprocate to 
intentions independently from any change in outcome. As a result, these studies could not rule out the 
possibility that individuals reciprocate due to reasons other than just intentions, such as the desire to 
maintain one’s image as an individual that returns favors and adheres to norms of reciprocity. In addition, 
this is the first study to test for reciprocity using actual items and gifts, which more closely resemble 
favors often encountered in daily life than the more abstract favors often used in reciprocity studies. 
Finally, no laboratory study specifically studied promotional gifts by examining whether gifts with 
ulterior motives could still induce positive reciprocity. The results from this study are consistent with the 
hypotheses that intentions matter even for promotional gifts with ulterior motives.  
 
Literature Review 
 
There is plenty of evidence suggesting that promotional gifts can be optimal for the firm. 
Beltramini (1992, 2000) collaborated with a construction products retailer and showed that small gifts 
($20-$40 letter openers) improved consumer attitudes toward the firm and increased construction product 
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purchases after the gift was sent. Small gifts also can increase support for a non-profit; Falk (2007) 
showed that inexpensive gifts from a charity can increase donations fourfold.5 The Hare Krishna 
solicitation strategy is another example that was already discussed earlier in this paper (Cialdini 2006).   
 However, there is little evidence on whether and why these promotional products are so effective. 
Economic models propose that individuals derive utility from rewarding kind intentions and punishing 
unkind intentions (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). 
However, it is unclear whether intentions can apply to reciprocity to promotional gifts, since these may 
not be perceived as kindly intended. For instance, Cialdini (2006) notes that many donors to the Hare 
Krishna gave grudgingly and did not appreciate the gift (many tossed the item into the trash). 
 Instead, there may be alternative motivators of reciprocity at work in these contexts. In the Hare 
Krishna example, social image or self-image concerns could have motivated people to reciprocate out of 
reputational concerns. This would be consistent with anthropological studies which show that gift-giving 
practices entail social image concerns across many primitive (Mauss 1950) and modern-day cultures 
(Shen, Wan, and Wyer 2011). Social pressure and image concerns have also been shown to influence 
other norms, including altruism (Andreoni, Trachtman and Rao 2012; DellaVigna, List and Malmendier 
2012) and equality (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). 
 Image motivators of reciprocity could be founded upon guilt and guilt avoidance. Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2004) suggest that preferences for fairness could be driven by a desire to avoid guilt; in 
particular, they stress that others’ expectations matter and a person feels “pressured” to be fair because it 
is common knowledge that others expect him to be fair. Similarly, Blanco and co-authors (2010) propose 
that, in the absence of complete information, people ask themselves what they would expect if their 
positions were reversed, and then assume others hold similar expectations. Thus, recipients of gifts may 
feel the need to reciprocate because they expect that others expect reciprocation, and their self-image will 
suffer (i.e., they will experience guilt) if they do not oblige. 
                                                            
5However, the gifts used in this field experiment were also designed to invoke emotional responses beyond just 
reciprocity; the charity benefited orphans, and the gift consisted of postcards designed by the orphans. 
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 On the other hand, intentions may still matter, perhaps because we are evolutionarily hard-wired 
to view most gifts in a kind manner. Social scientists suggest that reciprocity is an evolutionarily favored 
outcome since it encourages cooperative and altruistic behavior (Nesse 2009; Axelrod 1984), and this 
may cause us to assume gifts in neutral or positive contexts to always be kindly intended. Promotional 
gifts are often handed out in a neutral or positive manner (and in the case of sales professionals, often by 
attractive personnel), and thus we may find it difficult to infer anything but positive intentions from such 
gifts. 
 This study represents the first to test between these motivators of reciprocity. Experiments in 
economics have shown that reciprocity occurs in many contexts, but they often shed little insight on the 
motivations behind reciprocity. For instance, studies on the Gift Exchange game show that offering 
higher-than-equilibrium wages can induce higher effort in workers (Akerlof 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
Riedl 1993, 1998), but do not discuss the reasons why individuals reciprocate. Malmendier and Schmidt 
(2012) examine whether cash gifts can influence agents in a principal-agent setup. Their study confirms 
that reciprocation to gifts can occur in anonymous one-shot settings, but it does not causally identify a 
mechanism behind why this reciprocation occurs. In addition, these studies used only cash gifts, which 
may not generalize to non-cash gifts; people perceive cash differently and do not always respond the same 
to cash versus non-cash gifts (Kube, Marechal, and Puppe 2012). 
  
Experimental Design 
Experimental Task 
 In all sessions, each subject played three variations of the dictator game, two of which involved 
gift-giving decisions. Subjects were seated in front of computers and randomly assigned by the computer 
to one of two roles, called role 0 and role 1. These corresponded, respectively, to the dictator and non-
dictator in a standard dictator game. Subjects were told that for each task they performed, the computer 
would randomly and anonymously pair them with a subject of the other role. Subjects were informed that 
they would retain their role throughout Parts I-III of Section 1 of the experiment. Parts I-III each 
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corresponded to one of the three versions of the dictator game in the experiment. The order in which 
subjects played each version was randomized across sessions, but every subject played all three versions. 
No feedback or pay information was given to subjects until the end of the entire experiment. 
 One of the three versions of the dictator game, the Gift Treatment, was designed to elicit a 
baseline level of reciprocation to gifts. To begin, the non-dictator was endowed with an item with three-
fourths probability. If the non-dictator received an item, a picture of the item would appear on the 
recipient’s screen. The dictator was not informed whether their partner received any item. The non-
dictator could choose whether to give the item to their partner or keep the item for themselves. They made 
this choice by clicking on either a “yes” or a “no” radio button (see Figure 1a). If they select yes, the 
dictator was told that their partner had given them an item, and a picture of the item appeared on their 
screen (Figure 1b). If the item was not given, the dictator was told that they did not receive an item from 
their partner (Figure 1c); the dictator was also reminded that their partner may not have had an item to 
give.6 The dictator then chose an allocation out of a $10 pie. While the dictator made his choice, their 
partner was asked how much they expected to be given. Subjects repeated this task eight times; each time 
was with a new, random and anonymous partner. Subjects were told that one of the eight rounds would be 
selected for payment. 
 The Intentions Treatment was designed to measure whether subjects reciprocated to nothing more 
than a person’s intentions. To begin, the non-dictator was again endowed with an item with three-fourths 
probability. Similar to the Gift Treatment, the non-dictator chose whether to give this item to their 
partner. However, if the item was given, the computer would prevent the gift exchange with probability 
one-half; when this occurred, it would be announced to both players (see Figure 2). Dictators then chose 
how much of a $10 pie to allocate to their partner. Non-dictators were simultaneously asked how much 
they expected to be given. Thus, dictators at times made allocation decisions knowing that their partner 
intended to give them an item, but were prevented from doing so by the computer. Subjects repeated this 
                                                            
6 This is to prevent dictators from punishing their partners for not giving them an item. 
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task eight times; each time was with a new, random and anonymous partner. Subjects were told that one 
of the eight rounds would be selected for payment. 
 The Control Treatment did not include any gift-giving and was designed to control for 
preferences over total wealth distribution. Receiving a gift would unbalance the distribution of wealth 
between both players; the Control Treatment isolated the effect that this change in wealth distribution had 
on dictator allocations. Since reciprocity and fairness are closely related concepts, it is important to design 
the experiment in a way that can separately estimate the effects of each (Charness and Rabin 2002). To 
begin, one of the two players was endowed with an item with three-fourths probability. If the dictator was 
the one endowed with an item, then their partner would be informed exactly what item the dictator 
received (see Figure 3). This is identical in wealth and information to the Gift Treatment when a gift item 
was given to the dictator by their partner.7 As before, dictators were then asked to make their allocation 
decision, while non-dictators were asked what they expected to receive from the dictator. Subjects 
repeated this task eight times, each time with a new, random and anonymous partner. Subjects were told 
that one of the eight rounds would be selected for payment. 
 
Session Types 
 I ran two different types of sessions in this study: Standard and Self-Image.8 In both session 
types, subjects play the Gift Treatment, Intentions Treatment, and Control Treatment, as described in the 
previous section. In Standard sessions, subjects play each of these Treatments exactly as already 
described. 
                                                            
7 In some rounds, the non-dictator is the one endowed with an item, and the dictator is informed that their partner 
has an item. This is identical in wealth and information to when intention-to-give is announced but the gift is 
prevented by the computer. 
8 In pilot tests, I attempted an anonymous Social Image session where dictator allocations were overridden by the 
computer to $1 with 33% probability. This meant dictators could allocate $1 and obscure whether the allocation 
came from the dictator or the computer. In this way, dictators could theoretically avoid public image concerns from 
not reciprocating. This design mimics Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), but unlike their study, my study maintained 
subject anonymity. As a result, dictator public image was not very strongly manipulated by this design, and the pilot 
test showed no effect of the treatment. A true public image treatment would need to violate anonymity, as in 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) or Tadelis (2011), and may still induce stronger reciprocity. 
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 In the Self-Image sessions, dictators still play each of the Treatments described above, but they 
are also informed that at the end of the experiment, they will be told how their allocations compare to 
allocations made by dictators in previous sessions. They are instructed that this will be reported to them 
via a percentile rank (see Figure 4), and that they will receive separate rankings that detail how they 
allocated under different scenarios (i.e., when they received a gift, when they did not receive a gift, and so 
on). If self-image drives reciprocation to gifts, then dictators should allocate more in response to gifts than 
in the Standard sessions. Likewise, if self-image drives reciprocation to just the intent to give a gift, then 
allocations when a gift is attempted should also be higher in Self-Image sessions. Finally, note that if self-
image increases concerns over fairness in wealth distributions, then base allocations in all rounds should 
be higher in the Self-Image sessions. 
 
Items 
 In all sessions, there were three possible items that could be given in the experiment: a small-
value item, a large-value item, and an actual cash item. The small-value item was a pen (market value in 
the $1–$2 range). The large-value item was a small duffel bag (market value in the $10–$12 range). The 
cash item consisted of two one-dollar bills. When a subject received an item, a picture of the item was 
shown; the same picture was used for all subjects and rounds.  
 Studies suggest that people infer different intentions behind cash versus non-cash gifts (Kube et 
al. 2013). For instance, a cash gift may be interpreted as a bribe, and it may not be seen as a kind 
intention. By using a cash gift and a non-cash gift of similar value (the pen), I can directly test whether 
people reciprocate more to the non-cash item. 
 In addition, the Hare Krishna example suggests that even an undesirable and value-less gift, such 
as a flower, can have significant effects on reciprocity. By using a small-value item that is relatively 
undesirable, I can test whether such a gift can induce reciprocation. In addition, by comparing 
reciprocation to a small- versus large-value item, I can measure the degree to which the value of the gift 
affects the degree of reciprocity displayed. 
19 
 
 Questionnaire 
 At the end of the experiment, but before being informed of the outcomes from their dictator 
games, subjects filled out a questionnaire. This elicited basic demographics such as age, gender, and race. 
In addition, the questionnaire included a 20-question Machiavellianism scale (Christie and Geis 1970). If 
dictators rate high in Machiavellianism, they should show less concern over their partner’s final pay. 
Subjects were also asked to estimate the value of the items in the experiment, and to rate how much they 
wanted each item on a 5-point Likert scale. Subjects were also asked to talk about what they thought the 
experiment was about, and what likely motivated each person’s actions in the game. Finally, subjects 
were asked to estimate the number of economics experiments they have participated in, and whether they 
had ever played a similar game before. 
 
Procedure 
 The sessions were run at CASSEL in the UCLA Public Affairs building and at SSEL in the 
Caltech Social Sciences building. Subjects were recruited via e-mail blasts to registered users in the 
CASSEL subject pool and the SSEL subject pool. Each CASSEL session recruited a maximum of 50 
subjects, and sessions averaged 28 subjects. Each SSEL session recruited a maximum of 30 subjects and 
averaged 16 subjects.9 Subjects were asked to take a seat in front of a computer. Each seat also contained 
a packet of handouts and a unique, printed ID number.  
 Subjects were welcomed and given a series of instructions that were also printed in their handouts 
(see Appendix A at the end of the thesis). First, they were told to open zLeaf by double-clicking on the 
icon, as the experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were then told that the 
experiment was on decision-making, and that items could also be earned in today’s experiment; they were 
told the exact items they would have a chance to earn. They were also instructed that the study was 
anonymous and did not contain any deception. Next, they were told that each subject would be assigned 
                                                            
9Since the SSEL lab was smaller and consisted of a different subject pool, I ran control sessions at both SSEL and 
CASSEL. Thus, there are control groups of the proper type for each subject population and session size. 
20 
 
to either role 0 or role 1. Subjects then clicked on a button in zTree, and their role assignment was 
displayed to them. They were then told that this would be their role assignment for all of Section 1 of the 
experiment. They were then instructed to enter their unique, printed ID number into zTree, as they would 
later be paid according to those IDs. 
 The instructions for Part I of Section 1 was then read out loud to them. Part I could be the Gift 
Treatment, the Intentions Treatment, or the Control Treatment; the ordering was randomized across 
sessions. The instructions explained the exact decisions that each role would face, as well as the exact 
information that each role would have about the other. For instance, the non-dictators knew that if they 
kept the item for themselves, the dictator would not be able to tell that they had withheld an item from 
them (since both players knew that in some rounds, no item would be given to either player). Subjects 
were also informed the number of rounds they would play, and that one of those rounds would be selected 
for payment. A similar procedure took place when subjects reached Part II and then Part III of Section 1 
of the experiment (Parts II and III consisted of the remaining two Treatments). 
 Upon finishing Part III of the dictator games, subjects were told that Section 2 would consist of a 
questionnaire that would require them to answer questions about both themselves and their experience in 
today’s experiment. When subjects completed the questionnaire, the computer selected three rounds for 
payment and informed the subjects of their earnings. In the Self-Image sessions, the dictators would also 
see information on where their allocations ranked relative to their peers from past sessions; this was 
shown just prior to the pay screen. 
 When all subjects finished the questionnaire, subjects were then paid according to their unique, 
printed ID number. Gift items that were earned during the experiment were also handed out by the lab 
manager (at CASSEL) or the experimenter (at SSEL). At this time, the experimenter also informed 
subjects that there was a minimum pay of $15 for the experiment, and that those with lower pay would 
have their earnings rounded up to the minimum. The minimum pay was implemented to maintain 
compliance with CASSEL and SSEL subject pay standards. 
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Results 
 
 The first three sessions were run at CASSEL at UCLA. These sessions were Standard sessions. 
CASSEL closed in June 2013; as a result, one Standard session and three Self-Image sessions were run at 
SSEL at Caltech. Statistical tests show that subjects from different subject pools behaved similarly; there 
were no significant differences in how non-dictators and dictators acted between subject pools. I thus 
combine sessions from different subject pools into one dataset. I analyze the Standard sessions first.10 
 
Standard Sessions 
 There were 90 subjects across the three Standard experimental sessions at CASSEL, and 20 
subjects in the Standard session at SSEL. In the CASSEL sessions, half of the subjects were assigned as 
dictators, yielding 45 dictators. In the SSEL session, approximately three-fourths of subjects were 
dictators, yielding 14 dictators (this was done to increase the number of dictators in the smaller SSEL 
subject pool; since instructions did not explicitly state that pairings were one-to-one, this did not 
necessitate any changes to the instructions). Dictators made 24 allocations (8 in each of the Gift, 
Intentions, and Control treatments) for a total of 1416 dictator allocations.  
 
Summary Statistics 
Figure 5a shows the distribution of dictator allocations by treatment and item. In the first graph, 
the gold histogram displays allocations when the dictator received no item from their partner, and no 
intention-to-give was announced; the black-outlined graph displays when their partner intended to give 
the dictator a gift, but the dictator did not end up with the item. This graph shows that the intention-to-
give shifted allocations to the right. In the next three graphs, the gold histogram displays allocations from 
the Control treatment (when gifts come from the computer), while the black-outlined graph displays 
                                                            
10 No sessions or subjects were dropped from the data. No stopping rule was used; I ran sessions until the subject 
pools at each institution were exhausted (i.e., until I was unable to recruit sufficient-sized sessions within a one-
month timeframe). 
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allocations when the item is from the other player. These demonstrate that dictators allocated more when 
they received the item from their partner than when they received the item from the computer.11 
The table in Figure 5a shows that gifts also shifted dictator types. Receiving an item from the 
computer caused approximately 40% of selfish dictators that typically allocate $0 (when no gift is given) 
to instead allocate a positive amount; this is a wealth distribution effect. Receiving a gift from their 
partner caused an additional 20% of selfish dictators to allocate a positive amount; this is a reciprocity 
effect. Additionally, simply the intent to give a gift caused approximately 20% of selfish dictators to 
allocate a non-zero amount. No dictator averaged allocations of $5 or more for any treatment-item 
combination. 20% of dictators allocated $0 in all rounds. 
Figure 5b show average allocations in each treatment-item pairing, including rounds where no 
item was received. Dictators allocated $0.60 on average when they received no item from the computer, 
$0.64 when they received no item from their partner, and $1.30 when their partner tried to give them an 
item but the transaction was blocked. Thus, allocations nearly doubled in response to intentions-to-give 
relative to other rounds where the dictator also ended up with no item.  
In the Control Treatment, when dictators received an item from the computer, they allocated more 
to their partner. When they received a pen, allocations averaged $1.17, an increase of $0.57 from when 
the dictator receives nothing. A $2 cash gift from the computer increases the average allocation to $1.54. 
Finally, a duffel bag from the computer increases the average allocation to $1.75. These are all wealth 
distribution effects. 
When dictators received an item from their partner, they allocated more than when they received 
the same item from the computer. A pen from their partner raised average allocations to $1.50, an 
increase of $0.33 from when they receive the pen from the computer. When dictators received $2 from 
their partner, they allocated $2.31 on average, or $0.77 more than when they received $2 from the 
computer. Finally, when dictators received a duffel bag from their partner, they allocated $2.59, an 
                                                            
11 Dictators allocated essentially identically in the Control and Gift treatments when they received no item and no 
intention-to-give was announced. These histograms are not shown, but they overlap more or less exactly. 
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increase of $0.84 over what they allocated when they duffel bag came from the computer. These are all 
reciprocity effects after controlling for wealth distribution preferences. 
Figure 6 shows non-dictator giving behavior by treatment and item. In treatments where giving 
was allowed, non-dictators gave their items to their partners on average 44% of the time. The pen was 
gifted nearly 80% of the time it was received; the cash was gifted 15% of the time, and the duffel bag was 
gifted 38% of the time. Clearly, non-dictators preferred to hold onto the cash, suggesting that they 
generally did not expect the cash gift to yield an increase in allocation of greater than $2. Note that giving 
patterns were identical between both Gift and Intentions treatments, suggesting that the 50% chance of 
having a gift returned did not influence a non-dictator’s likelihood of choosing to give a gift. 
 
Regression Analysis (Standard Sessions) 
 
     1. Base regression specification 
 To measure how dictators differentially responded to each type of gift, I run a linear regression 
model with dollars allocated as the dependent variable (Model (1) in Table 1). I add indicators that 
identify when the dictator ended up with the small-value item, the large-value item, and the cash item. 
This captures the change in a dictator’s allocation caused purely by having additional wealth in the form 
of the item. I interact the indicators for each item with another indicator that specifies whether the item 
was received from their partner (as opposed to from the computer/experimenter). I also add an indicator 
for rounds where a partner’s intention to give was announced, but where the computer disallowed the gift 
(henceforth referred to as “returned gifts”). Finally, I add treatment indicators to ensure that, conditional 
on the above explanatory variables, allocation patterns were not different across treatments. I also assume 
subject random effects and I cluster standard errors by subject.12 
                                                            
12Random effects assumptions are met because all covariates are determined exogenously to the dictator (i.e., by 
their randomly selected partner or by the experimenter). Subject fixed effects yield almost identical results for all 
regressions in this paper, and the Hausman test comparing coefficients between the random effects and fixed effects 
models always suggests there is no systematic difference in their coefficients (p>0.98 for Model (1) discussed here). 
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     2. Wealth effects 
The regression results indicate that preferences over wealth distribution can have a significant 
influence on a dictator’s allocation. In Model (1), the baseline allocation corresponding to when the 
dictator had no item was $0.60. Simply possessing the small-value item increased allocations by another 
$0.58, approximately doubling the amount allocated relative to possessing no item. Possessing the large-
value item similarly increased allocations by $1.14. Possessing the two-dollar cash item increased 
allocations by $0.94, thus splitting the $2 cash item between players fairly evenly. All three wealth effects 
are significant at the p<0.01 level, suggesting that dictators had clear wealth distribution preferences. 
     3. Reciprocity to gifts 
Model (1) also indicates that, beyond simple wealth effects, receiving an item from their partner 
caused dictators to reciprocate. Receiving a large-value item from their partner increased dictator 
allocations by another $0.62. This effect was in addition to the increase in allocation caused by simply 
possessing the large-value item, which was a $1.14 increase. Receiving the cash item or small-value item 
from your partner instead of from the computer increased allocations by $0.60 and $0.25, respectively. 
These effects are significant at the p<0.05 level, implicating a clear reciprocity effect.  
     4. Reciprocity to intentions 
Model (1) strongly suggests that intentions matter for reciprocation. When intention-to-give is 
announced but the gift is disallowed, dictators reciprocate by allocating more to their partner. In fact, the 
effect of a returned-gift is similar in magnitude to the reciprocity effects for receiving a large-value item, 
suggesting that intentions alone are enough to engender a large reciprocity effect. In Model (2), I replace 
the returned-gift indicator with an “intentions” indicator that takes a value of 1 for any instance where a 
gift is given or intention-to-give is announced. Not surprisingly, since the returned-gift indicator had such 
a large coefficient, this alternate regression suggests that intentions alone drive all of the observed 
reciprocity effects (after controlling for wealth distribution effects). 
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     5. Punishment for not giving 
Finally, Models (1) and (2) suggest that dictators did not punish their partners if they did not 
receive a gift. The treatment indicators are either insignificant or marginally positive, suggesting that 
dictators allocated similarly when they received no item in a round, regardless of whether they were in a 
Treatment where their partner was allowed to give them an item. Thus, dictators did not punish subjects 
for not giving a gift. Most likely, this is due to the fact that dictators were aware that in some rounds, their 
partner would not be endowed with any item to give (they were reminded of this fact in every round). 
     6. Tobit specifications 
 Model (3) runs Model (1) using a panel Tobit specification that is left-censored at 0.13 Since 
dictators could not allocate less than $0, there is significant “piling” at 0 which could skew the results of a 
linear model. The Tobit specification corrects for this and yields very similar results. As in Model (1), 
wealth distribution, reciprocity, and intentions all significantly influence how a dictator allocates. Thus, 
these results are robust to correcting for data censoring.14 However, it is important to note that there were 
12 dictators (out of 59) that always allocated 0 in all 24 rounds. These 12 dictators have no within-group 
variation; in the random-effects Tobit specification, they are dropped from the within-group analysis, thus 
yielding biased results. For this reason, for future regressions I only show OLS specifications, although 
Tobit regressions yield similar results in all instances. 
     7. Non-dictator expectations 
Model (4) examines whether controlling for the non-dictator’s expectations over allocations can 
account for the observed wealth and/or reciprocity effects. Blanco et al. (2010) suggest that reciprocity is 
driven by acting according to how you believe others expect you to act.15 However, Model (4) shows that 
                                                            
13 Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 re-samples) and re-sampled by cluster. 
14 Tobit specifications of Model (2) are also consistent with Model (2). 
15 Directly soliciting dictator beliefs on partner-expectations would yield biased responses if solicited directly after 
the actual allocation decision. Likewise, soliciting dictator beliefs directly prior to the allocation decision would bias 
the allocation decision. Instead, I directly solicited non-dictator expectations after the non-dictator chose whether to 
give a gift. 
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partner-expectations of the allocation are not a predictor of the actual allocation; in addition, wealth and 
reciprocity effects are still significant after controlling for partner-expectations. 
     8. Effects by treatment type  
 Model (5) examines whether dictators responded differently to gifts in different treatments. Since 
gifts given in the Intentions treatment are returned with 50% probability, it is possible that dictators view 
those gifts as “less” kindly intended, since they were given with the knowledge that the item might not 
actually exchange hands. Thus, while Models (1)-(4) separately identified reciprocity effects for each 
item but pooled responses from all treatments, Model (5) instead pools all items into a single category and 
interacts receiving a gift with each of the non-Control Treatments.16 
 Model (5) yields wealth and reciprocity effects that are very similar to those in Model (1). In the 
Gifts Treatments, a gift from a partner increased allocations on average $0.44, while in the Intentions 
Treatments, a gift from a partner increased allocations by $0.43. The 50% possibility of a gift-return in 
the Intentions Treatment did not seem to cause dictators to perceive the gifts any differently. 
 Since Model (5) only differs from Model (1) in whether gift effects are collapsed across treatment 
or not, the other results from Model (1) also are evident in Model (5). The returned-gift effect is identical, 
as is the lack of punishment effects. Model (5)’s results are also robust to Tobit specifications. 
 
Self-Image Sessions 
 I ran three Self-Image sessions in the SSEL lab at Caltech, yielding 44 subjects total. As before, 
since SSEL has a smaller subject pool than CASSEL, I paired each non-dictator with three dictators, so 
that three-fourths of subjects are dictators. This yielded a total of 31 dictators in Self-Image sessions and 
744 dictator allocations. Since subjects behaved similarly in the SSEL Standard session as those in the 
three CASSEL Standard sessions, I use all four Standard sessions as a baseline for analyzing the Self-
Image sessions. 
                                                            
16 I also run regressions that interact each separate type of gift with each Treatment. This results in twelve different 
interaction terms (3 gift types x 4 treatment types). Results are generally consistent with Models (1)–(5), but due to 
small sample sizes for each interaction term, most do not reach critical statistical significance thresholds. 
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Basic Patterns of Behavior 
Figure 7a displays the distribution of allocations by treatment and item. Results are similar to 
what was observed in the Standard Sessions. The first graph in Figure 7a shows that intentions-to-give 
caused dictators to increase their allocations relative to counterfactuals. The next three graphs 
demonstrate that dictators allocated more when they received the item from their partner than when they 
received the same item from the computer. The table shows that gifts can shift dictator types; 45% of 
dictators allocate nothing when they receive no item, while only 13% of dictators allocate nothing when 
they receive an item. As in the Standard Sessions, approximately half of this effect is due to wealth 
distribution preferences, and the other half is due to reciprocity.  
 Figure 7b shows the summary statistics across treatments and items for the Self-Image sessions. 
The average allocation across all treatments was $2.07, more than double the $0.99 average across the 
Standard sessions. The average allocation is still close to $2 after excluding outliers. Conversely, dictators 
showed similar reciprocity effects as those observed in the Standard sessions; self-image did not cause 
dictators to reciprocate more than dictators in the Standard sessions. Together, this suggests that image 
concerns in DGG affected wealth distribution preferences but not reciprocity. 
 Figure 8 examines non-dictator giving behavior by treatment and item. When giving a gift was 
allowed, non-dictators gave their items to their partners on average 58% of the time, an increase from the 
44% average in the Standard sessions. This could be because the non-dictator is aware of the increased 
Self-Image saliency to the dictator; knowing this, they might believe that gifts will have a greater effect 
and be more likely to give the gift. 
 
Regression Analysis (Both Session Types) 
 
     1. Regression specification 
 To measure whether Self-Image saliency can cause dictators to allocate differently, I re-run 
Model (1) but only on the Self-Image sessions – this is Model (6). Model (7) includes both Standard and 
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Self-Image sessions and adds an indicator for Self-Image. I interact this indicator with each covariate to 
separate wealth distribution and reciprocity effects in Standard versus Self-Image sessions. 
     2. Interactions between wealth distribution and self-image 
 Model (6) and (7) both indicate that, in accordance with the summary statistics, preferences over 
wealth distribution have a larger magnitude effect on a dictator’s allocation when self-image is more 
salient. In Model (7), the baseline Self-Image indicator has an effect size of $0.93, suggesting that 
dictators allocate $0.93 more than in the Standard session when receiving no item.  
     3. Interactions between reciprocity and self-image 
The regressions also indicate that gifts cause dictators to reciprocate. Model (6) shows that 
dictators in self-image sessions still respond to intentions; returned-gifts led to $0.58 greater allocations 
on average, which is very similar in magnitude to the effect sizes observed in the Standard sessions. In 
addition, receiving a large-value item from their partner increased dictator allocations by another $0.47. 
Model (7) shows that all types of gifts induced reciprocity, but that the interactions between self-
image and each gift item are not statistically significant. This suggests that reciprocity to gifts (after 
controlling for wealth distribution) are relatively similar between the Self-Image and Standard sessions.  
    4. Robustness checks 
In unreported regressions, I run similar robustness checks as I do for the Standard sessions. 
Results do not change when including partner-expectations as a control, or when changing the intention-
to-give indicator to the one used in Model (2). Finally, these results are all robust to Tobit specifications. 
 
Regression Analysis (All Sessions, Subject Heterogeneity) 
 
     1. Regression specification 
 Social preferences are often highly heterogeneous (Erlei 2008). Model (8) runs a simple linear 
regression on a number of demographic variables known to correlate with selfishness, including gender 
and Machiavellianism. I also include indicators for ethnicity to test whether guilt-based cultures (i.e., 
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Caucasians) are more likely to reciprocate. Lastly, I also include a threshold variable representing whether 
a subject has participated in five or more economics experiments.21 Since reciprocity to gifts was not 
statistically different in Standard versus Self-Image sessions, I simply include Self-Image as an indicator 
but do not interact it with each of the reciprocity indicators.  
     2. Baseline effects on allocation 
 Dictator behavior is very heterogeneous along these different characteristics. Those who have 
more experience participating in economic experiments allocate marginally less; they may have learned to 
treat experiments as a selfish source of income. Not surprisingly, Machiavellianism is also a significant 
predictor of selfishness. When I break Machiavellianism into its sub-parts – see Model (9) – it is the 
Tactics score that is driving all of the explanatory power of Machiavellianism. Naturally, the Tactics sub-
score should correlate with dictator behaviors more closely than the Morals or Views sub-scores. Even 
when controlling for these differences, wealth effects, gift reciprocity effects, and intentions effects are 
still present and highly significant.  
 
     3. Interaction effects with gifts 
 In unreported regressions, I interact each of these subject traits (gender, experience, race, and 
Machiavellianism22) with an indicator identifying whether the dictator received a gift from their partner. I 
run each trait independently of the others in order to preserve power. None are robustly significant. Thus, 
while these traits are predictive of lower allocations overall, they do not seem particularly predictive of 
propensity to reciprocate to gifts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21 Choosing a different threshold has no substantive effect on these results. 
22For Machiavellianism and experience, I use binary indicators representing whether the variable is above a 
particular threshold. 
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Interpretation and Discussion 
 
 This study used a gift-giving task embedded within a dictator game to measure whether intentions 
and self-image can motivate reciprocity to gifts given with ulterior motives. This represents the first study 
to directly measure whether intentions that yielded no change in outcome can still induce reciprocal 
behavior. This is also the first study to test whether self-image concerns can increase reciprocal behavior. 
Finally, this study also sheds insight on how people interpret intentions behind a gift that is clearly given 
in order to induce reciprocation.  
In all regression analysis, intentions very robustly predicted reciprocation. When intentions to 
give a gift were announced, allocations increased significantly even when the gift was not allowed to be 
given. The effect sizes were also generally large; dictators reciprocated to a returned-gift to the same 
degree that they reciprocated to the cash and large-value gifts. In addition, over 20% of dictators that 
normally allocated $0 in standard dictator games reciprocated positively to intentions to give a gift, even 
when those gifts yielded no change in outcomes.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis people have a tendency to view gifts as kindly intended, 
even when they may be given with an ulterior motive. Social scientists have suggested that our mindset 
towards gifts and favors is evolutionarily selected for and it could be, to some degree, hard-wired in us 
(Axelrod 1984; Nesse 2009) to respond with a positive mindset to any sort of gift or favor. 
The results did not provide evidence that self-image can motivate reciprocity. When self-image 
was more salient, dictators still reciprocated, but not to a greater magnitude than dictators in the Standard 
sessions. Importantly, self-image also did not cause dictators to change how they responded to the intent 
to give a gift; dictators reciprocated similarly to intentions in both Self-Image and Standard Sessions. This 
suggests that reciprocation to intentions is not likely being driven by a self-image motive; that is, the 
intent to give a gift is not being interpreted as a favor that needs to be reciprocated in order to preserve 
one’s self-image. Instead, the intent is more likely simply interpreted as a positive or kind intention. 
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This study also derived very robust results on dictator preferences over wealth distribution. 
Dictators allocated more when they obtained an item and their partner did not. In addition, these wealth 
distribution preferences were affected by the saliency of self-image concerns. Dictators implemented 
more equitable allocations in all of the Self-Image sessions relative to the Standard sessions. These results 
are consistent with models that suggest guilt-aversion can drive fairness (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
2004), and it complements evidence that suggests social image concerns can also drive fairness in wealth 
distribution preferences (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). 
However, it is important to note that the observed self-image effects on wealth distribution 
preferences could also be interfering with self-image effects on reciprocity. The self-image treatment 
increased allocations in all rounds, and this effect could crowd out additional effects of self-image on 
reciprocity. Likewise, this increase in baseline allocations could push dictators toward a ceiling on 
allocation amounts that they refuse to go past. This could restrict how much a dictator could reciprocate 
upon receiving a gift.23 
The gifts in the lab were meant to mimic, at some level, the gifts that marketers and non-profits 
use to induce reciprocity. The cash item generated robust reciprocation, while the small-value item 
generated weaker reciprocation despite the fact that subjects estimated its price to be approximately $2, 
the same monetary value as the cash item. This runs counter to Kube et al. (2012), which suggested that 
cash is not as effective a gift as a non-cash item of equal value. This discrepancy could simply be due to 
the difference in desirability of each item. It could also be because Kube et al. used a wage increase 
instead of an outright cash gift; future research can help determine whether people infer slightly different 
intentions from a wage increase versus a cash gift.25  
The large-value item generated the largest and most robust reciprocation results. This indicates 
that the value of the gift does matter; however, on average subjects reciprocated less than a dollar more in 
                                                            
23Further tests can attempt to draw this distinction; however, fairness norms are often present in the same contexts as 
when reciprocity norms are present, and thus this interaction between norms may accurately represent some 
situations in the field where reciprocity plays a role. 
25 If so, this may carry implications for employee incentive compensation; for instance, perhaps year-end bonuses 
are more effective at conveying positive intentions and engendering worker reciprocity than a wage increase. 
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response to the large-value item relative to the small-value item. This was despite the fact the large-value 
item was estimated by subjects as worth $14 on average. Even after factoring in the additional amount 
that dictators allocated due to changes in wealth distribution, the large-value item was not cost-effective 
for the gift-giver in this particular context. This may be because the $10 pie was too small relative to the 
perceived value of the duffel bag. Nonetheless, this suggests that to optimize the use of promotional gifts, 
firms naturally must choose a gift of the right value relative to the desired reciprocal outcome. 
These results as a whole affirm the intentions-based approach toward modeling reciprocity (Rabin 
1993). Perhaps surprisingly, people reciprocate positively even to gifts that are given with an ulterior 
motive. In addition, intentions can induce reciprocation even when those intentions do not actually change 
or improve the intended recipient’s welfare. Conversely, individuals do not seem to reciprocate to 
promotional gifts (or to intentions) only due to a need to preserve one’s self-image as a reciprocator. 
There are additional possible motivators of reciprocity that this study does not explore. First, 
public image (and not self-image) may still motivate reciprocity. In the Hare Krishna example, 
individuals may donate so that the solicitor and the others in the airport do not view the person as a non-
reciprocator. Follow-up studies would need to violate anonymity in order to test this public image 
hypothesis. In addition, it is possible that dictators view the intention to give a gift as unkind, but still feel 
obligated to reciprocate because the intention to give a gift leaves the dictator indebted to their partner. 
This would also be consistent with the Hare Krishna anecdote. Future studies should attempt to test 
whether this “obligation aversion” can also drive reciprocity. 
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Figure 1. Gift Treatment – Screenshots 
 
 
 
 
       1c. Message to Dictator if No Gift 
 
 
 
 
  
1a. Non-Dictator’s Screen 1b. Dictator’s Screen 
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Figure 2. Intentions Treatment – Messages Upon Gift-Return 
 
 
    2a. Message to Dictator 
 
 
    2b. Message to Non-Dictator 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Messages in Control Treatments 
 
 
   3a. Message to non-Dictator about Dictator’s item 
 
 
3b. Message to Dictator about what their Partner Knows 
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Figure 4: Social Comparison Information, Sample Screenshots (Self-Image Sessions)
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Figure 5a: Allocations by Item, Standard Sessions 
 
 
  
 
Number of Dictators Allocating $0 in all rounds  
(when receiving no item, and when receiving an item) 
 
 
 
 
 
*Includes rounds in the Return treatment where the gift was not returned. 
#One subject here did not always give zero when receiving no item. 
^When a gift is returned, the dictator naturally never ends up with an item. 
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Figure 5b. Allocations by Item, Standard Sessions 
 
 
 
Gift From Item N* Mean ($)
Computer None 295 0.60 
Computer Pen 59 1.17 
Computer Cash 59 1.54 
Computer Duffel Bag 59 1.75 
Partner None 615 0.64 
Partner Pen 144 1.50 
Partner Cash 34 2.31 
Partner Duffel Bag 65 2.59 
Partner Gift Returned 86 1.30 
 1416 1.00 
*Note that there are multiple observations from each dictator within each group. 
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Figure 6: Non-Dictator Giving Rates, Standard Sessions 
 
Non-Dictator Giving Behavior 
Item Treatment Give Keep % Give 
Small-Value Item (pen) Gifts 81 21 79.4% 
Small-Value Item (pen) Intentions 80 22 78.4% 
Cash Item (two $1 bills) Gifts 18 84 17.6% 
Cash Item (two $1 bills) Intentions 13 89 12.7% 
Large-Value Item (bag) Gifts 35 67 34.3% 
Large-Value Item (bag) Intentions 43 59 42.2% 
Total  134 172 43.8% 
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Table 1. Allocation by Type of Gift Received, Standard Sessions 
DV = dollars allocated (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification OLS OLS Tobit^ OLS 
Dictators (Rounds) 59 (1416) 59 (1416) 59 (1416) 59 (1416) 
R2 0.123 0.121 -- 0.122 
Treatment Indicators     
          Gift 0.165* 
(0.099) 
0.145 
(0.099) 
0.455* 
(0.262) 
0.161 
(0.098) 
          Intentions -0.027 
(0.058) 
-0.047 
(0.060) 
-0.153 
(0.255) 
-0.030 
(0.058) 
Item Indicators     
          Has small item 0.581*** 
(0.115) 
0.488*** 
(0.117) 
1.650*** 
(0.265) 
0.588*** 
(0.116) 
          Has cash item 0.939*** 
(0.177) 
0.919*** 
(0.176) 
2.227*** 
(0.364) 
0.944*** 
(0.177) 
          Has large item 1.135*** 
(0.218) 
1.092*** 
(0.215) 
2.441*** 
(0.389) 
1.150*** 
(0.218) 
Gift-from-Partner*Item Type Indicators     
          Given small item by partner 0.254** 
(0.126) 
-0.204 
(0.161) 
0.512* 
(0.278) 
0.261** 
(0.127) 
          Given cash item by partner 0.604*** 
(0.192) 
0.077 
(0.297) 
1.051*** 
(0.395) 
0.625*** 
(0.194) 
          Given large item by partner 0.618** 
(0.276) 
0.107 
(0.297) 
0.792* 
(0.4437) 
0.628** 
(0.275) 
     
Partner’s gift was returned 0.620*** 
(0.154) 
 1.850*** 
(0.388) 
0.634*** 
(0.156) 
Intention-to-give  
 
 0.551*** 
(0.142) 
  
     
Partner’s E[Allocation]    -0.010 
(0.007) 
     
Constant 0.604*** 
(0.147) 
0.623*** 
(0.148) 
-1.854*** 
(0.527) 
0.628*** 
(0.142) 
     
Subject Random Effects YES YES YES YES 
All OLS SEs are robust and clustered by Subject.  
All Tobit SEs are bootstrapped (100 re-samples) and re-sampled by cluster. 
^Tobit is left-censored at 0 (883 left-censored observations). 
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 2. Allocation by Treatment, Standard Sessions 
 
DV = dollars allocated (5) 
Specification OLS 
Dictators (Rounds) 59 (1416) 
R^2 0.120 
Treatment Indicators  
          Gift 0.169* 
(0.096) 
          Intentions -0.032 
(0.063) 
  
Item Indicators  
          Has small item 0.440*** 
(0.125) 
          Has cash item 1.000*** 
(0.185) 
          Has large item 1.214*** 
(0.211) 
Gift-from-Partner * Treatment Indicators  
          Gift * Gift Treatment 0.436*** 
(0.143) 
          Gift * Intentions Treatment 0.433*** 
(0.158) 
  
Partner’s gift was returned 0.624*** 
(0.159) 
Constant 0.604*** 
(0.148) 
  
Subject Random Effects YES 
                              All SEs are robust and clustered by Subject.  
                                           *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 7a: Allocations by Item, Self-Image Sessions 
 
 
 
Number of Dictators Allocating $0 in all rounds  
(when receiving no item, and when receiving an item) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
*Includes rounds in the Return treatment where the gift was not returned. 
#Three subjects did not always give zero when receiving no item. 
^One subject did not always give zero when receiving no item. 
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Figure 7b Summary Statistics, Self-Image Sessions 
 
 
Gift From Item N Mean ($)
Computer None 155 1.53 
Computer Pen 31 2.34 
Computer Cash 31 2.84 
Computer Duffel Bag 31 3.48 
Partner None 268 1.59 
Partner Pen 93 2.47 
Partner Cash 37 2.81 
Partner Duffel Bag 36 4.18 
Partner Gift Returned 62 2.04 
 744 2.07 
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Figure 8: Non-Dictator Giving Rates, Self-Image Sessions 
 
Item Treatment Give Keep % Give 
Small-Value Item (pen) Gifts 25 1 96.2% 
Small-Value Item (pen) Intentions 23 3 88.5% 
Cash Item (two $1 bills) Gifts 9 17 34.6% 
Cash Item (two $1 bills) Intentions 13 13 50.0% 
Large-Value Item (bag) Gifts 8 18 30.8% 
Large-Value Item (bag) Intentions 12 14 46.2% 
Total  90 66 57.7% 
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Table 3. Allocation by Type of Gift Received, Self-Image Sessions (OLS) 
DV = dollars allocated (6) (7) (8)
Sessions Self-Image All Self-Image
Dictators (Rounds) 31 (744) 90 (2160) 31 (744)
R2 0.092 0.166 0.093
Treatment Indicators 
          Gift 
 
0.067
(0.107) 
0.165*
(0.099) 
0.072
(0.110) 
          Intentions 
 
-0.036
(0.123) 
-0.027
(0.058) 
-0.048
(0.085) 
Item Indicators 
          Has small item 
 
0.806***
(0.249) 
0.582***
(0.115) 
0.759***
(0.230) 
          Has cash item 
 
1.306***
(0.312) 
0.939***
(0.177) 
1.247***
(0.289) 
          Has large item 
 
1.952***
(0.420) 
1.135***
(0.217) 
1.915***
(0.409) 
Gift-from-Partner*Item Type Indicators
          Given small item by partner 
 
0.102
(0.117) 
0.253**
(0.126) 
0.142
(0.125) 
          Given cash item by partner 
 
0.320
(0.250) 
0.603***
(0.192) 
0.329
(0.254) 
          Given large item by partner 
 
0.453
(0.282) 
0.617**
(0.275) 
0.404
(0.296) 
Partner’s gift was returned 
 
0.611***
(0.234) 
0.619***
(0.154) 
0.587***
(0.224) 
Partner’s E[allocation] 0.025
(0.016) 
Session Indicator 
          Self-Image 0.929***
(0.351) 
Interactions with Self-Image: 
          Gift 
 
-0.098
(0.145) 
          Intentions 
 
-0.012
(0.104) 
          Has small item 
 
0.225
(0.272) 
          Has cash item 
 
0.368*
(0.355) 
          Has large item 
 
0.816*
(0.468) 
          Given small item by partner 
 
-0.151
(0.171) 
          Given cash item by partner 
 
-0.286
(0.313) 
          Given large item by partner 
 
-0.163
(0.391) 
          Partner’s gift was returned 
 
-0.009
(0.278) 
Constant 1.532***
(0.381) 
0.604***
(0.147) 
1.486***
(0.328) 
Subject Random Effects YES YES YES
All SEs are robust and clustered by Subject. *p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01 
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Table 4. Subject-level Characteristics 
 
DV = dollars allocated 
(8) 
All Sessions 
(9) 
All Sessions 
Groups / Subjects 90 (2160) 90 (2160) 
R2 0.256 0.265 
Treatment Indicators   
          Gift 0.133* 
(0.075) 
0.133* 
(0.075) 
          Intentions -0.030 
(0.048) 
-0.030 
(0.049) 
Session Indicator   
          Self-Image 0.565 
(0.414) 
0.636 
(0.489) 
Item Indicators   
          Has small item 0.651*** 
(0.111) 
0.651*** 
(0.111) 
          Has cash item 1.062*** 
(0.157) 
1.063*** 
(0.158) 
          Has large item 1.406*** 
(0.204) 
1.406*** 
(0.204) 
Gift-from-Partner * Item Type Indicators   
          Given small item by partner 0.203** 
(0.092) 
0.203** 
(0.092) 
          Given cash item by partner 0.491*** 
(0.165) 
0.491*** 
(0.165) 
          Given large item by partner 0.582*** 
(0.202) 
0.582*** 
(0.202) 
   
Partner’s gift was returned 0.606*** 
(0.202) 
0.606*** 
(0.131) 
Subject-level Traits   
          Male -0.024 
(0.292) 
0.014 
(0.291) 
          Machiavellianism -0.048** 
(0.022) 
 
                    Mach-Tactics  -0.093** 
(0.040) 
                    Mach-Morals  0.070 
(0.127) 
                    Mach-Views  -0.037 
(0.032) 
         5+ Past Studies Participated -0.866*** 
(0.299) 
-0.891*** 
(0.305) 
         Caucasian (guilt-based culture) 0.016 
(0.413) 
0.064 
(0.397) 
Constant 3.670 *** 
(1.322) 
3.751*** 
(1.340) 
   
Subject Random Effects YES YES 
      All SEs are robust and clustered by Subject. 
      *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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C H A P T E R  T W O  
 
Introduction 
 
 The pharmaceutical industry spends up to $50 billion annually in the U.S. to build relationships 
with and market products to physicians (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008). Much of this money supports tens of 
thousands of sales representatives, who visit physicians’ offices laden with free gifts and meals for 
physicians and their entire staffs (Rockoff 2012). Healthcare administrators have expressed concern over 
the impact of such activities on prescription patterns and normative patient care standards, and many have 
urged for stricter regulation of pharmaceutical marketing (Dana and Loewenstein 2003; Steinbrook 2009). 
For instance, non-profits such as The Prescription Project and physician groups such as the American 
Medical Student Association (AMSA) have campaigned for both mandatory and voluntary physician 
abstention from industry sponsored gifts, meals, and events. 
 State and federal governments have responded by increasing regulations on certain aspects of 
physician-industry interactions. In 2009, the state of Massachusetts implemented a physician payments 
sunshine law requiring that all pharmaceutical companies annually publish a list of Massachusetts-
licensed doctors they provided gifts, meals, or consulting payments to. While other states have 
implemented marketing disclosure policies, Massachusetts is the first to implement a disclosure policy 
specific to industry-physician interactions, and where disclosure is to the public and not just to a 
government entity.1 More recently, the U.S. Congress extended this type of disclosure to the national 
level via a provision within the Affordable Care Act. This provision required all pharmaceutical 
companies to publicly disclose all forms of compensation to U.S. physicians starting in 2013. 
 This study tests how the 2009 Massachusetts sunshine law affected doctor prescriptions in 
Massachusetts. I use a difference-in-differences design that examines pre- and post-sunshine law 
                                                            
1 Minnesota, Washington D.C., and Vermont have public disclosure policies as well, but their disclosures 
information is not collated into an easily accessible electronic dataset. Minnesota and Vermont also ban most gifts, 
so disclosure in those states are limited to permissible, small-value gifts and items such as samples. 
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prescriptions in Massachusetts, while using prescriptions from doctors in other states as the control group. 
In total, I compare four years of prescriptions by 2,877 doctors in Massachusetts with four years of 
prescriptions by 2,878 doctors in four comparable states.  
 To date, there has been little empirical evidence on how these types of disclosure policies might 
affect prescribing. Laboratory studies suggest that disclosure can cause some individuals to opt out of 
conflicts-of-interest situations when opting out is possible (Sah and Loewenstein 2014). In a prescriptions 
context, this could imply that doctors will opt out of industry gifts and meals in response to disclosure. On 
the other hand, experiments also show that disclosure policies can cause those that disclose to feel 
morally licensed to be biased (Cain, Loewenstein and Moore 2005), since conflicts-of-interest are now 
common knowledge across all parties. Thus, disclosure to patients may allow some doctors to feel 
morally licensed to prescribe a marketed drug more often.  
 There could also be other negative consequences to stricter regulations on industry-physician 
interactions. Pharmaceutical companies publicly proclaim that these marketing activities are necessary for 
spreading product efficacy information to practitioners (e.g., PhRMA 2011). Without sales 
representatives and sponsored conferences, new drug information that is relevant to best practices could 
take longer to reach physicians; indeed, some academic studies have shown outcomes consistent with this 
hypothesis (e.g., Huang, Shum and Tan 2012). 
I find that in aggregate, the disclosure law decreased prescriptions of branded, marketed drugs. 
More specifically, disclosure decreased branded drug prescriptions by 290,000 scripts in Massachusetts 
for just these doctors and these specific drugs, and for just the first 24 months after the law was passed. 
Importantly, disclosure also increased prescriptions of generic drugs, but only by approximately 100,000 
scripts. This suggests that disclosure led to a decrease in total prescribing volume.2 
These effects of disclosure are likely driven by doctor-level concern for their image. That is, 
doctors who did not want to harm their public image by disclosing conflicts-of-interest would stop 
                                                            
2 For comparison, from 7/2007-7/2011, the dataset contains 10.7 million prescriptions, of which 4.2 million are of 
branded drugs. 
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accepting free gifts and meals. As demonstrated by previous literature (Larkin et al. 2012), these changes 
to their interactions with industry would then lead to changes in prescriptions. Consistent with this, 
doctors that had nothing to disclose post-law were more affected by disclosure than those who chose to 
accept gifts and meals post-law. This suggests that those with nothing to disclose likely changed their 
habits to a greater degree than those with payments to disclose. This mechanism is also consistent with 
laboratory evidence that disclosure can motivate some (but not all) agents to opt out of conflicts-of-
interest when faced with mandatory disclosure (Sah and Loewenstein 2014). Importantly, doctors that 
accepted and disclosed gifts or meals still decreased prescriptions of branded drugs in response to 
disclosure, but just not to the same magnitude; thus, they displayed no evidence of moral licensing, at 
least in aggregate. 
In addition, evidence in this paper suggests that pharmaceutical marketing influence is largely 
non-informational in nature. First, the results show that shocks to non-informational sources of influence 
such as free gifts and meals can alter prescriptions. Second, disclosure did not disproportionately affect 
newly released branded drugs (branded drugs that had been on the market for one year or less3), even 
though salespeople play a more informational role for these newer drugs. These results argue against 
industry’s claims that salesperson influence occurs primarily through informational channels. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on conflicts-of-
interest, disclosure policies, and pharmaceutical marketing. Section III discusses the data sources and raw 
data trends. Section IV presents the main regression results on policy effects. Section V discusses the 
mechanisms that might be driving the observed effects. Section VI presents regression results that identify 
separate policy effects on Massachusetts doctors that disclosed meals or consulting payments after the 
sunshine law took effect. Section VII provides evidence on the informational versus non-informational 
influences of marketing. Section VIII concludes.  
 
 
                                                            
3 Results are similar when using slightly different cutoffs for defining newly released branded drugs. 
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Relevant Literature 
 
Biases from Conflicts-of-interest 
 There are multiple laboratory examples of how conflicts-of-interest can distort our perceptions 
and decision-making. Moore, Tanlu and Bazerman (2010) use a lab setting to show that when people are 
incentivized to advocate in favor of a position, they are later biased in their judgments when asked to be 
objective; this occurs even when the incentive is non-monetary and when the latter judgments are private 
and incentivized for objectivity. Babcock et al. (1995) demonstrate a similar effect in a judicial context. 
 These effects may be driven in part by motivated reasoning (Festinger 1954; Festinger and 
Carlsmith 1959), which refers to when people seek out and interpret information that confirms what they 
want to believe. In the context of conflicts-of-interest, people will be biased towards their favored 
position (Gneezy, Saccardo and van Vedhuizen 2013), especially when there is ambiguity in the 
environment (Haisley and Weber 2010). Malmendier and Schmidt (2012) further show that in a principal-
agent setup, a simple monetary bribe from a third party will increase an agent’s likelihood of aligning 
with that third party’s preferences, even if that outcome is detrimental to the principal. Altogether, these 
studies suggest that conflicts-of-interest can significantly bias individual decision-making, both at one’s 
own expense and at the expense of a client. 
 
Conflict-of-interest Disclosure Policies 
 Sah and Loewenstein (2014) examine whether mandated or voluntary disclosure can cause agents 
to opt out of conflicts-of-interest when opting out is possible. This study implemented a simple 
adviser/advisee setup, where the adviser was given more information about a risky gamble and was 
responsible for providing advice on risky choices to the advisee. The advisers were allowed to choose 
between two incentive schemes, only one of which introduced a conflict-of-interest with their 
responsibilities to the advisee. With mandated disclosure, more than half of all advisers chose to opt out 
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of the payscheme that introduced a conflict-of-interest between their own pay and their responsibilities to 
their advisee, even though this payscheme could yield higher payoffs to the adviser. 
 However, Cain, Loewenstein and Moore (2005) demonstrate how disclosure of conflicts-of-
interest can fall short of correcting for these biases. In particular, the authors show that when conflicts-of-
interest are disclosed, agents may exaggerate their bias in anticipation that others (e.g., the principal, aka 
the patient) will discount their advice. In a second, similar study by the same authors (2011), they 
demonstrate that agents believed it was more morally acceptable to exaggerate their advice when the 
conflict-of-interest is disclosed. This suggests that agents can feel morally licensed to be biased when 
their conflict-of-interest is known to the recipient of their advice. 
 Some medical studies have examined disclosure in medical publications. One such paper found 
that pharmacology studies with results supporting the use of calcium channel antagonists were much more 
likely to contain financial conflict-of-interest disclosures than studies with neutral or negative results 
(Stelfox, Chua, O’Rourke, and Detsky 1998). However, this suffers from endogeneity; do researchers 
tend to find results that support their sponsor, or do companies simply sponsor research that is more likely 
to find support for their products? A similar study by Perlis et al. (2005) suffers from the same 
endogeneity concerns. Finally, since disclosure is always mandated in these contexts, these studies do not 
directly test whether disclosure has any causal effect on each paper’s findings and recommendations. 
 Pham-Kanter et al. (2012) used the 2004 Maine and West Virginia sunshine laws to measure the 
effect of disclosure on doctor prescriptions. They examined selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), a class of antidepressants, as well as statins, which treat high cholesterol. They found that these 
disclosure policies did not cause any changes to the rates of branded drugs prescribed relative to 
neighboring states. However, these states’ disclosure policies did not require public disclosure of 
payments; instead, disclosure was only to a state government department. Thus, doctors knew that their 
patients had no information on physician-industry interactions, and the effects measured by this study 
have no relation to public disclosure. These results may not generalize to the effects of the Massachusetts 
or federal disclosure laws, both of which require disclosure via a publicly searchable database. 
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Biases from Pharmaceutical Marketing 
 Researchers have speculated that doctors with conflicts-of-interest are likely biased in their 
decision-making (Dana and Loewenstein 2003). Within the medical literature alone, enough has been 
published to require three successive meta-analyses (Lexchin 1993; Wazana 2000; Spurling et al. 2010). 
More than half of the studies examined in these meta-analyses have indicated that marketing activities can 
alter prescription decisions or related aspects of patient care; however, over one-third of those studies 
found no such effect. In addition, many of these medical studies are small-sample cases that focused on a 
small group of physicians and drugs (e.g., Orlowski and Wateska 1992; Loertscher et al. 2010; Chren and 
Landefeld 1994), and almost all only looked at correlations. Thus, their results are difficult to generalize. 
 The marketing literature also struggles to handle endogeneity in doctor-industry relationships. 
These studies obtain data on physician-level prescriptions over time, as well as physician-level measures 
of marketing exposure over time. They then run regressions to estimate the effect of marketing exposure 
on prescriptions (e.g., Gonul et al. 2001; Mackowiak and Gagnon 1985; Manchanda and Chintagunta 
2004; Mizik and Jacobson 2004; Rizzo 1999). However, this methodology is confounded since 
pharmaceutical companies selectively target only a subset of physicians. The companies track physician 
prescriptions on a bi-weekly basis and change their marketing tactics in response to changes in a 
physician’s prescription patterns (Fugh-Berman and Ahari 2007). Researchers attempting to use actual 
data on marketing and prescriptions cannot determine whether changes in marketing exposure led to 
changes in prescribing, or if changes in prescribing led to changes in marketing exposure. 
 Most recently, a paper by Larkin et al. (2012) used a quasi-experimental methodology to 
circumvent these endogeneity and small-sample constraints. The authors treated changes in academic 
medical center policies that governed marketing activities as exogenous to physician-industry 
interactions. Therefore, changes in prescription patterns (relative to controls) could be directly attributed 
to the effects of bans on various marketing activities.  
 I use a difference-in-differences approach akin to Larkin et al. (2012), but I instead evaluate the 
effects of the Massachusetts disclosure law on prescriptions. I also identify doctor-level effects by 
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incorporating data made available through the Massachusetts disclosures database. This lets me identify 
doctors that accepted payments from industry and measure whether this sub-group of doctors responded 
differently to disclosure. Finally, by examining drug-level differences, such as whether newly released 
drugs are differentially affected, I can evaluate whether the observed effects are driven by informational 
or non-informational sources of influence. This evaluates the accuracy of industry claims that salesperson 
influence is solely through informational channels, such as the distribution of clinical trials results. 
 
Data 
 
Data Overview 
 The base dataset can be broken down into five main components: (1) physician–hospital 
affiliations over time for all physicians affiliated with any academic medical center (AMC) in one of six 
metropolitan regions (MSAs), one of which is in Massachusetts;4 (2) monthly prescriptions by each 
physician from January 2006 to December 2012 for all drugs within nine drug classes; (3) drug 
characteristics such as whether a drug is branded and when a generic version became available for a 
branded drug; (4) the list of doctor names published by the state of Massachusetts for having accepted 
industry payments any time between July 2009 and December 2012; and (5) details on all academic 
medical center (AMC) marketing policies.  Each of these components is listed in more detail in Figure 1. 
 
(1) Physicians and Affiliation Data 
 The data consists only of physicians who are affiliated full-time with an academic medical center 
(AMC). I make this choice for several reasons. First, since AMC-level policies on marketing activities are 
publicly available, using AMC-affiliated doctors allows me to control for the marketing activities that are 
allowed or not allowed at every physician’s workplace. I can therefore evaluate whether AMC policies 
are complements or substitutes to the Massachusetts disclosure policy. Second, full-time attending 
                                                            
4 These MSAs are chosen simply because they contain the most AMCs within each region. 
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physicians at AMCs are generally salaried clinical faculty members whose patients are derived through 
referrals from primary care physicians. Thus, both income and patient volume for these doctors are 
relatively independent from their actual reputation or public image. If the results suggest that these 
doctors are averse to disclosing industry conflicts-of-interest, I can better isolate the reasons why these 
particular doctors might care (or not care) about their reputation. Finally, I choose these doctors because 
their 2006-2009 prescriptions data were already available to me through a previous paper (Larkin et al. 
2012). 
 Next, I obtained a list of all physicians that were full-time affiliated with any of the 35 AMCs in 
these MSAs.5 This data was obtained from IMS Health, a leading pharmaceutical market research firm. 
IMS identified all hospitals that were owned or otherwise governed by these AMCs.6 IMS also surveys 
hospitals on a quarterly basis in order to obtain physician–hospital affiliations data. IMS identified all 
attending-level (FTE) physicians affiliated with any of these hospitals for at least one quarter between 
January 2006 and June 2009. In total, 9,998 physicians met these criteria and are initially included in this 
dataset. Physicians did not switch affiliations very frequently in the dataset (only 12% switch at any point 
in the data); for affiliations data corresponding to July 2009 – December 2012, I simply carry forward the 
affiliations data from June 2009.7 
 
(2) Prescriptions Data 
IMS Health also provided physician prescriptions data. IMS compiles monthly doctor-level 
prescriptions data by purchasing data directly from retail pharmacies. In total, IMS purchases data on 
approximately 75% of the retail market and projects the rest using geographic and demographic variables. 
This is the most comprehensive dataset available on the market, and IMS is widely considered the best 
source of prescription data by pharmaceutical companies and academic researchers alike. However, since 
                                                            
5 Physicians that did not write prescriptions for drugs in this study are excluded. 
6 Note also that, per IMS, no hospital-AMC affiliations changed during this timespan.  
7 Additional affiliations data for 2010-2012 would require additional funding to purchase; in addition, IMS does not 
hold on to historical affiliations data, as affiliations data is only useful to their pharmaceutical clients if it is current 
information. This implies that doctors newly affiliated with these AMCs after July 2009 are not included in the data. 
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the data represents only the retail market, prescriptions filled at hospital pharmacies or by mail are not 
included. Additionally, prescriptions that are written but not filled are not observed in the data. IMS 
provided total prescriptions filled for every physician-drug-month in the dataset. 
The dataset included monthly prescriptions data for 377 drugs in nine drug classes of varying 
sizes: statins, antihyperglycemics, proton pump inhibitors, antihypertensives, sleep aids, antidepressants, 
anxiolytics, antihyperactives and antipsychotics. These drug classes were specifically chosen based on 
physician feedback, which identified these classes as a composition of drugs that are heavily marketed 
and not marketed at all. For each of these drug classes, all drugs within the class (according to IMS 
classifications) were included except for drugs that were rarely, if ever, prescribed during this time span.  
This prescription data was purchased in two batches. The first, purchased in 2010, covered 218 
drugs from January 2006 – June 2009 and was used for the study Larkin et al. (2012). The second batch, 
purchased in summer 2013, covered all original 218 drugs that were still commonly prescribed (some 
were no longer produced or commonly prescribed by June 2009); in addition, this second batch added 
new drugs from these drug classes that entered the market around or after June 2009 and were commonly 
prescribed, thus bringing the total number of drugs in the study to 377.  
 
(3) Additional Drug Data 
Additional details about each drug are obtained through the FDA’s database on FDA-approved 
drugs. This data identifies whether a drug is branded, and if so, whether and when a generic version of it 
became available on the market. In this paper, to proxy for whether a drug is marketed in a particular 
month, I simply identify whether the drug is branded and whether a generic version was on the market in 
that month. This measure is highly correlated with whether a drug was actually marketed by salespeople 
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in that month.8 Additional data provided by the FDA database include the FDA approval date and 
manufacturer(s) for each drug. 
(4) Massachusetts Disclosures 
 Data on Massachusetts doctors that accepted industry payments in July 2009-December 2012 are 
publicly available and were downloaded from the Massachusetts Department of Health and Human 
Services. This dataset includes the name of each doctor and the type of compensation they received (e.g., 
consulting fees, gifts, or food), as well as the valuation of what they received. This data was merged to the 
IMS dataset using doctor name; since doctor name is not necessarily a unique identifier, this introduces 
noise into the data, but it should not bias the results.  
Table 1 summarizes the disclosures data. In total, there are 4,278 doctors in my data that were 
affiliated with a Massachusetts AMC after the sunshine law was implemented, although only 2,877 
remain after data exclusions (see the subsequent sub-section titled “Data Exclusions”). Of these, 430 
doctors accepted a meal of $50 or greater at least once and 370 doctors accepted consulting payments at 
least once. Conditional on having accepted a meal, the average doctor-year value of meals accepted is 
$235. Consulting payments are much higher; conditional on having accepted a consulting payment, the 
average doctor-year value of consulting payments was $12,107. 
 Note the following two caveats on Table 1. First, in 2009, only 6 months of data are included, 
since the policy took effect in July 2009.  Second, in 2012, there are fewer entries; while this may partly 
be because doctors are accepting fewer meals and consulting payments over time, it is mostly due to a 
change in reporting requirements. For 2012 and onwards, the Massachusetts state legislature relaxed the 
requirements on what types of payments have to be reported; in particular, payments already reported to 
the federal government due to the federal sunshine law (which was supposed to begin tracking payments 
in 2012, although  they did not start until 2013) did not have to be reported to Massachusetts. 
 
                                                            
8 I have monthly data on the number of salespeople assigned to each drug from January 2006-June 2009. This 
measure correlates almost perfectly with whether a drug is branded with no generic version on the market. I use the 
latter as a proxy for whete a drug is marketed in a given month, since I do not have sales force data for 2010-2012. 
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(5) AMC Policies 
In total, the 9,998 physicians in the dataset held full-time affiliations with 35 different AMCs that 
were located in or near the six chosen MSAs. I obtained dated hard copies of policies for all 35 AMCs 
through the conflict-of-interest policy database maintained by the Institute of Medicine as a Profession 
(IMAP). This organization, whose mission is to shape medical professionalism, regularly submits 
requests to all U.S. medical universities asking them to provide copies of their marketing policies. In 
private phone interviews with over 25 hospital administrators, I confirmed the information contained in 
many of these policy documents. I classify each policy according to the restrictions they place on a 
variety of marketing activities, including restrictions on accepting gifts, consulting contracts and free 
meals. These are listed in Table 2. Many of these policies followed a general set of recommended rules 
provided by the Association of American Medical Centers (AAMC) in a 2008 publication. 
The minimum policies in place at every AMC are determined by PhRMA self-regulation 
guidelines that were published in 2002.9 Among other restrictions, the PhRMA regulations restricted gifts 
to $100 per salesperson visit and also banned purely recreational gifts such as golf outings and concert 
tickets. These trade regulations theoretically represent the rules that governed marketing behavior at all 
AMCs regardless of AMC policy.10  
 The Massachusetts doctors in the dataset are mostly affiliated with one of four AMCs. These are 
the medical centers owned or operated by Boston University, University of Massachusetts, Tufts 
University, and Harvard University. Each of these implemented restrictions on industry-physician 
interactions at different points in time. BU and UMass implemented restrictions before the sunshine law 
took effect. The remaining two, Tufts and Harvard, implemented restrictions after the sunshine law was 
already in effect. Some of the Massachusetts physicians in the data are affiliated with a hospital owned by 
Partners Healthcare, a Massachusetts non-profit organization that is affiliated (but not owned by) Harvard 
and Tufts, and which also implemented their own marketing restrictions in 2009. Each of these 
                                                            
9 PhRMA is a trade group including all major U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
10Physicians and administrations indicated that most salespeople were obedient to these guidelines.  
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institution’s policies varied in the types of restrictions placed on marketing activities; for instance, 
Harvard only bans personal gifts to doctors, while UMass bans all gifts, even those that are educational 
(e.g., medical textbooks) or professional (e.g., surgical shears) in nature. 
 
Data Exclusions 
 When analyzing the data, I exclude several types of observations from the data. Primarily, this is 
done to keep the analysis and interpretation as simple and clean as possible. Importantly, statistical 
significance results in this paper are virtually all robust to analyzing the full dataset; in fact, disclosure 
effects are often larger in magnitude and greater in statistical significance when using the entire dataset. 
 First, I drop doctor:drug-class pairings that are almost always zero. For instance, the psychiatrists 
in the dataset will prescribe many drugs from the antidepressants class, but they virtually never prescribe 
any drug from the statins class. Likewise, cardiologists do not prescribe antidepressants frequently, but do 
prescribe many statins. I drop all doctor:drug-class pairings where the doctor prescribed fewer than 100 
scripts of an entire drug class over all 84 months of the data. This is an extremely low threshold; a doctor 
would essentially have to prescribe no more than a single script per month of an entire drug class to fall 
under this threshold. This eliminates pairings such as psychiatrist-statins or cardiologist-antidepressants, 
and this reduces the dataset from approximately 24 million doctor-drug-month observations and 10,000 
doctors to slightly over 16 million observations and 7,400 doctors. In unreported tests I determine that 
policies do not affect how much of a particular drug class a doctor prescribes. 
 Second, I drop doctors who, according to IMS Health designations, have full-time attending 
affiliations to multiple AMCs for at least one quarter in the sample. These doctors may split their time 
between many hospitals, making it more difficult to assess the exact marketing regulations they are 
subject to at all times. This reduces the data to approximately 14 million observations and 6,300 doctors. 
 Third, I drop all doctors who switch hospitals or states at some point in the dataset. This rules out 
the possibility that doctors switched affiliations in response to any policies. This reduces the data to 
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approximately 13.5 million observations and 5,755 doctors. 2,877 of these doctors are in Massachusetts, 
and 2,878 are in other states.11 
 Finally, I focus all analysis on just the 24 months before and after the sunshine law was 
implemented. I exclude the months January 2006 through June 2007 in part because these coincide with 
the passing and implementation of Romney Care in Massachusetts. This bill required all Massachusetts 
residents to be covered under a health insurance policy, which could theoretically have some effect on 
how drugs were prescribed by doctors or filled by pharmacies. In addition, by focusing only on the two 
years before and after the treatment event, I reduce the likelihood of other events impacting the fixed 
differences assumption in the model. Importantly, the effects of the sunshine law are almost always of 
similar or greater magnitude and higher statistical significance when utilizing the full seven years of data. 
 
Data Summary and Parallel Trends 
 Figure 2 displays the raw data for branded drug prescriptions for the two years before and after 
the sunshine law was implemented. Note that branded drugs refer only to drugs that do not have a 
biochemically equivalent generic version on the market for a given month.12 The two lines represent the 
treatment and control groups. The MA group consists of doctors that are always affiliated with a 
Massachusetts AMC and are thus subject to the disclosure law as of July 2009. The Other group consists 
of doctors affiliated with AMCs in Pennsylvania, Illinois, New York, and California; based on their 
hospital affiliations data, none of these doctors were ever subject to any state disclosure requirements.13 
                                                            
11 I deliberately increased the number of Massachusetts doctors by including Partners Healthcare doctors, a 
Massachusetts private hospital group affiliated with Harvard and Tufts, but not owned by them like the other 
hospitals in the dataset. I do this because Partners issued their own hospital-level marketing policies, which I have 
data on. In addition, these doctors are similar to the other doctors in that they are clinical faculty and full-time 
affiliated with an AMC. All main results are robust to excluding Partners Healthcare doctors. 
12 Branded drugs that have a generic version already on the market are classified with the generics, since they are 
virtually never marketed and are also rarely prescribed. Even if a doctor prescribed such a drug, the pharmacist 
would likely replace it with the generic version (most insurance companies often require this), and the filled-
prescriptions data from IMS would only reflect a prescription for the generic. 
13 Note that if I break this graph out by individual state, New York is an outlier; branded drug prescriptions are 
relatively flat over time, and do not decrease the way the other states do. Since I cannot identify why New York 
differs, I have no exogenous reason for excluding it from the data. However, all results are robust to dropping New 
York (and indeed, dropping any single counterfactual state) from the analysis. 
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Since I have limited the data to doctors that never changed affiliations, the number of doctors in each 
group is constant; I therefore simply plot the total number of branded prescriptions that each group 
prescribed in each month. 
 Figure 2 provides a visualization of the parallel trends assumption necessary for analysis (see 
Figure 2B for a blow-up of the relevant trends). Figure 2 and 2B demonstrate that, over the one-year 
period prior to the treatment event, fixed differences in branded prescriptions is plausible between 
Massachusetts doctors and those in other states. Figure 2 also overlays a bar plot of the exact differences 
in each month; from August 2007 through August 2008, differences appear relatively fixed.  
 Figure 3 displays the full trends over the full seven-year period. Note that in 2006 and 2007, the 
difference in total branded prescriptions between Massachusetts doctors and other doctors is shrinking. 
This is simply because this set of Massachusetts doctors contains a significantly higher number of doctors 
prescribing psychiatric drugs than the set of control doctors. This is likely due to a difference in the 
distribution of doctor specialization between groups.14 This difference in distribution matters because in 
2006 and 2007, many highly prescribed psychiatric drugs went off patent, including several highly 
prescribed drugs: Xanax XR, Zoloft, Effexor, Wellbutrin XL, Ambien, Ambien Pak, Focalin, Paxil CR, 
and several others. Due to the difference in the distribution of doctor specializations in the treatment and 
control groups, branded prescriptions in Massachusetts are much more affected by these patent 
expirations. Figure 3B plots the non-psychotherapeutic branded prescriptions over time between both 
groups, and this illustrates that the trends are much more parallel when these psychotherapeutics are 
removed. 
 By similar logic, the trends in 2006-2007 are also parallel when the graphs are limited to branded 
drugs that remain on patent throughout the entire dataset. This analysis abstracts away from the effect of 
drugs being removed or added, but it also prevents the analysis from considering the full set of drugs 
within each class. Figure 4 displays prescriptions for just these drugs, and it further confirms that the 
                                                            
14 2134 out of 2877 MA doctors (74%) prescribe at least one psychiatric drug class in this dataset, while only 1912 
out of 2878 doctors in other states (64%) do so. As before, these figures are after dropping doctor:drug-class 
pairings where doctors prescribed fewer than 100 scripts of the entire class during this seven-year period. 
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discrepancy across groups in Figure 3 from 2006-2007 was due to differences in the number of doctors 
prescribing branded drugs that came off patent in those years. In addition, Figure 4 demonstrates that the 
decreasing trend in branded prescriptions over time (seen in Figure 3 in both treatment and control 
groups) was also due to drugs coming off patent. Importantly, all results in this paper are robust to 
including only this subset of drugs. Figure 4B magnifies the graph for the two years before and after the 
policy.15 
 If there is a policy effect on branded prescriptions, these graphs should show a change in slope 
around the time of policy implementation, but not a discontinuous jump in branded prescriptions. This is 
because the prescriptions data includes prescription refills, which constitute the vast majority of total 
prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. Patients already on medication that works for them will continue 
to stay on that medication regardless of changes to disclosure requirements (especially for the conditions 
treated by the drugs in this data, e.g., hypertension, depression, high cholesterol, etc.). Thus, refills are not 
likely to be affected by disclosure. Instead, disclosure will primarily affect first-time prescriptions, thus 
leading to a change in slope over time to branded prescriptions but not a discontinuous jump. 
 Figures 2 through 4 are suggestive of a change in slope in response to disclosure. The figures 
show relatively parallel trends in the year or two before the policy is implemented. In the time between 
when the law is signed (August 2008) and implemented (July 2009), branded prescriptions in 
Massachusetts begins to fall relative to the counterfactual. This likely reflects that in response to the law, 
doctors begin to cut off industry ties sometime in this eleven month period. This makes sense since 
doctors likely heard of the impending disclosure requirements sometime during this time period. For 
instance, the state released a summary of discussion points in December 2008 and announced the finer 
points of the policy in May 2009. Note also that the law was discussed during legislature sessions that 
began in late January 2008 and continued through the end of the sessions in July 2008, so the medical 
community may have been aware of the proposals even prior to the law being signed. 
                                                            
15 Figure 4B still excludes branded drugs that come off patent any time during the full seven-year dataset. 
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 Figure 5 provides the same graph as Figure 2, except it examines prescriptions of generic drugs 
instead of branded drugs. Since generics show a fairly fixed difference both pre- and post- sunshine law, 
the raw data suggests that mandated disclosure is more likely to affect how often branded drugs are 
prescribed rather than how often generic drugs are prescribed. 
 
Other Identification Concerns 
To avoid confounds, it is important to be aware of other changes to healthcare in Massachusetts 
that occurred around this time. There are two particular Massachusetts-specific changes to consider. 
1. Romney Care 
The most well-known Massachusetts-specific healthcare initiative in this time period is what is 
known as Romney Care, named after the Massachusetts governor who signed the law. This bill was 
signed in April 2006 and required that nearly all Massachusetts residents obtain a minimum level of 
health insurance coverage.16 To help implement this, the bill created an independent public authority, the 
Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector, to act as an insurance broker and offer subsidized private 
insurance plans to residents. This bill was driven in part due to rising costs of insurance, as well as 
concern over free-riders who did not have insurance but would use emergency room services for non-
emergency medical care. In 2010 the state also began restricting residents to an open enrollment period 
for purchasing insurance through the Connector (so that individuals could not as easily game the system). 
Importantly, these changes do not seem to have greatly affected prescription patterns. Figures 2-4 
show that in 2006-2008, during the first years of Romney Care and before the disclosure law was passed, 
prescription patterns between Massachusetts and the control states are relatively fixed after accounting for 
the distribution of physician specialties across states. This suggests that the effects of Romney Care on 
health insurance sign-ups did not significantly influence the rate of branded drug prescriptions in 
Massachusetts.  
                                                            
16 The bill also called for the state to provide free health insurance to those earning less than 150% of the federal 
poverty level, and it also required employers with more than 10 full-time employees to provide insurance to 
employees. 
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In addition, Romney Care is not likely to influence prescriptions in a manner that could be 
confused with any effects of the disclosure policy. Even if Romney Care affected prescriptions, it would 
likely be in the first years of the bill, in 2006-2007, and not around 2008-2009 when the disclosure policy 
was signed and implemented.17 Moreover, an increase in health insurance coverage should theoretically 
increase branded drug prescriptions, which is not necessarily the same directional effect as might be 
expected for the disclosure policy. This is because increased insurance coverage makes the expensive, 
branded drugs more affordable to patients; in addition, the increase in insurance coverage could also 
increase patient visits to doctors in general, thus increasing drug prescription volume. These all suggest 
against Romney Care being the driver of any observed decrease in prescriptions in response to the 
disclosure policy. 
 
2. Alternative Quality Contracts 
There is one other significant change to Massachusetts healthcare during this time period that is 
worth noting. In 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts launched a new payment arrangement, 
known as the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC); these contracts stipulated fixed payments for the care 
of a patient over a specified time period, and they connect payments to quality goals and a five-year 
budget (Chernew et al. 2011). In particular, providers could receive quality bonuses for staying under 
budget.  In 2009, seven provider organizations in Massachusetts entered into these contracts, and another 
four joined in 2010. However, even after 2010, this covered only 1600 primary care physicians and 3200 
specialists (Chernew et al. 2011), which represent a small fraction of the physicians in the state.   
These changes are unlikely to lead to changes in prescriptions. Research suggests that AQCs in 
Massachusetts did not have any impact on the use of either branded or generic drugs (Afendulis et al. 
2014). This study used a difference-in-difference approach comparing drug prescription usage by 
Massachusetts doctors belonging to providers that enrolled or did not enroll in an AQC in 2009. Since 
                                                            
17 As will be demonstrated, results are all robust to excluding the years when Romney Care would most likely have 
caused Massachusetts prescriptions to change relative to controls (2006 and 2007). 
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AQCs showed no effect on prescriptions between these two groups of Massachusetts doctors, it is likely 
that all analysis in this paper would be robust to including only doctors in Massachusetts that were not 
subject to an AQC. 
 
Aggregate Policy Effects 
 
Statistical Method: Doctor-Month Data 
 I first use a panel OLS specification to evaluate whether the sunshine law influenced 
prescriptions. For ease of interpretation, the first specification ignores drug-level data and collapses data 
down to the doctor-month level. In this specification, the dependent variable (DV) is simply the total 
number of branded scripts written by that doctor in a given month. The independent variable of interest is 
an indicator for whether a sunshine law was in effect for that doctor-month. This is represented as: 
   Rit = β0  +  β1*sunshinest  +  λ1 *Xt                    (1) 
 
where i represents the doctor, t represents the month, s represents the state, and Xt represents control 
variables including doctor and month fixed effects. These fixed effects help control for the fact that doctor 
specialty is not distributed equally across treatment and control groups. Rit represents branded 
prescriptions in that doctor-month, and sunshinest  is the indicator for the sunshine law. That is, it takes a 
value of 1 if a sunshine law was in effect for that doctor-month. For doctors in Massachusetts, sunshinest 
takes a value of 0 in all months prior to July 2009, and 1 for all months from July 2009 onwards. For 
doctors not in Massachusetts, it always takes on a value of 0. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the AMC level. Although the disclosure policy and thus treatment 
is at the state level, I only have five states in the data and clustering over so few states could lead to bias 
(Cameron and Miller 2014). Instead, I choose to cluster at the AMC level, which can also partially 
account for institution-level correlations in prescriptions (e.g., philosophical practices, administrative 
influences, patient demographics, etc.). However, all results are robust to clustering at the doctor or state 
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level instead. All regressions include the same data exclusions specified earlier, although results are also 
robust to including any or all of those data. 
 
Results: Doctor-Month Analysis 
 Table 3 displays regression results for the doctor-month specification. Model (1) suggests that the 
sunshine law caused doctors to prescribe 2.25 fewer branded scripts per month. This represents 
approximately 10% of the average branded scripts per doctor-month. Model (2) shows the same 
regression but on generic scripts per month. Disclosure may cause generic scripts to increase by 
approximately 2.5 scripts per month, but the result is only marginally significant. In addition, since 
generics are prescribed at much higher volumes than branded drugs,18 this increase in generic drugs 
would only represent an approximately 4% change to average generic scripts per doctor-month. Thus, 
disclosure seems to affect branded, marketed drugs more than it affects generic drugs. 
 
Statistical Method: Doctor-Drug-Month Data 
 I now incorporate drug-level data into the analysis. The primary DV of interest is the number of 
scripts of a specific drug prescribed by a particular doctor in a given month. The main independent 
variable of interest is whether a sunshine law is in place. The full regression model is represented as: 
Rijt = β0  +  β1*sunshinest  +  β2*marketedjt + β3*(marketedjt*sunshinest)   +  λ1 *Xt             (2) 
 
where i represents the doctor, j represents the drug, t represents the month, s represents the state, and Xt 
represents a vector of control variables. As before, the sunshine variable is an indicator for the 2009 
Massachusetts sunshine law.  
The marketed variable represents whether a drug is marketed by its manufacturer in a given 
month. For simplicity, I use a binary indicator that represents whether the drug is branded with no generic 
                                                            
18 On average, generic prescriptions represent approximately 75% of the total prescriptions in this dataset, with the 
ratio increasing in favor of generics over time (due to branded drugs coming off patent over time). 
67 
 
 
 
version available in that month. This represents whether a firm is incentivized to market that particular 
drug, and it correlates very strongly with whether a drug is actually marketed by sales reps or not. 
The marketed*sunshine interaction separates the effect of the sunshine law on marketed drugs 
from the effect on non-marketed (i.e., generic) drugs. The coefficient for sunshine (β1) measures the effect 
of policies on non-marketed drugs, and the coefficient for marketed*sunshine (β3) measures the additional 
effect that policies have on marketed drugs. To properly interpret how the sunshine law affects a 
marketed drug, I will take the linear combination of the coefficients for sunshine and marketed*sunshine.  
The remaining variables are a set of controls. This includes month fixed effects as well as 
doctor*drug fixed effects. State and AMC fixed effects are not included, since the sample is limited to 
doctors that never switch affiliations (so doctor is collinear to state and AMC). Since including both fixed 
effects and a lagged dependent variable can complicate identification (Angrist and Pischke 2008), the 
base specifications use fixed effects but no lag. Standard errors are clustered at the AMC level. 
In a follow-up regression, I run the same specification but replacing the DV with a drug’s 
marketshare. That is, for each observation, I divide the total prescriptions of that drug by the total number 
of drugs prescribed by that doctor in that month. This analysis adjusts the policy effect to account for 
differences in total prescribing volume across doctors. 
 
Results: Doctor-Drug-Month Data 
 Table 4 (Model 3) displays the fixed effects panel OLS results from the above specification. The 
sunshine law significantly affects the prescriptions of both branded and generic drugs. Mandated 
disclosure causes generic drugs to increase on average by 0.07 scripts per doctor-month for every generic 
drug in the dataset prescribed by that doctor. Likewise, branded drug prescriptions decreased on average 
by 0.56 scripts per doctor-month for every branded drug the doctor prescribes. This suggests that the 
policy led to approximately 290,000 fewer prescriptions of branded drugs for just the Massachusetts 
doctors and drugs in this dataset; generics increased by approximately 100,000 prescriptions. This implies 
that the disclosure policy caused doctors in Massachusetts to prescribe fewer drugs overall. This in turn 
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could imply that meals and payments from pharmaceutical companies caused doctors to prescribe 
branded drugs to patients they otherwise would not have prescribed anything to. 
 I also run a number of unreported robustness checks. Results are still statistically significant at the 
same thresholds when clustering standard errors by state or doctor. Results are robust to excluding each of 
the four Massachusetts AMCs in turn, excluding each of the counterfactual states in turn, or limiting the 
analysis to drugs that are always marketed or always generic throughout the entire dataset. Results are 
also robust to including all seven years of data. In placebo tests, I assign the sunshine law to another 
state/month pair, and these placebo tests show no negative effects of disclosure on prescriptions. 
 I also run a number of robustness checks to account for any concerns over the fixed differences 
assumption between treatment and control states. First, results are robust to including a lag covariate with 
no fixed effects, or using an Arellano Bond GMM estimator that includes both a one-month doctor-drug 
lag as well as doctor, drug, and month fixed effects. Second, results also hold when including linear 
doctor-drug level trends as a covariate (in addition to the already included doctor-drug fixed effects). 
Third, the results are robust to using only subsets of the data where the parallel trends assumption is more 
closely satisfied. As mentioned, this includes using only drugs that are always generic or always on patent 
during this timeframe. This also includes using only the single counterfactual state, Pennsylvania, that 
most closely parallels Massachusetts in terms of pre-treatment trends. Results are also robust to using a 
control group consisting only of counterfactual doctors that are matched to a treatment doctor according 
to a nearest-neighbor match algorithm, where the match is assigned according to pre-treatment 
prescription patterns that account for both prescription volume and the distribution of prescriptions across 
drug classes. 
 Model (3B) estimates the same specification but using drug marketshare as the DV. Under these 
assumptions, the disclosure policy still has a positive effect on generics and a negative effect on branded 
drugs. In particular, for each doctor subjected to disclosure, branded drugs decrease in marketshare by 
0.5% per branded drug on average, while generic drug marketshare increases by 0.2% per generic drug on 
average. The same robustness checks generally also hold when using drug-marketshare as the DV. 
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Statistical Method – Sunshine Law and AMC Policies 
 Since doctors in this dataset are all affiliated with an AMC, I can estimate disclosure effects after 
controlling for AMC policies on marketing activities. I use the following regression specification:  
 
Pijt = β0  +  β1*AMCut  +  β2*sunshinest  +  β3*marketedjt +  
β4*(marketedjt*AMCut)  +  β5*(marketedjt*sunshinest)  +  β6*(AMCut*sunshinest)  +       (2) 
β7*(marketedjt*sunshinest*AMCut)  +  λ1 *Xt       
where i represents the doctor, j represents the drug, t represents the month, u represents the 
university/AMC, s represents the state, and Xt represents a vector of control variables. The sunshine and 
marketed indicators are the same as in the previous specification. 
The AMC variable is an indicator that codes for the AMC policies. This represents a vector of 
indicators representing whether meals bans or consulting restrictions are in place for a given AMC-
month. The marketed*AMC interaction separates the effect of each AMC policy on marketed drugs from 
their effect on non-marketed drugs.  
The last two interaction terms measure the additional effect on prescriptions of having both AMC 
and sunshine policies in place. The coefficient for AMC*sunshine (β6) represents the additional effect 
(beyond just β1 + β3) for months where both AMC and disclosure policies in place. Similarly, the 
coefficient for marketed*AMC*sunshine (β7) represents the additional effect on marketed drugs of having 
both policies in place. As before, the specification includes both month fixed effects and doctor*drug 
fixed effects. Standard errors are again clustered at the AMC-level.  
 
Results – Sunshine Law and AMC Policies 
 Table 5 displays the fixed effects panel OLS results using the specification described. The linear 
combinations of relevant coefficients are listed below the table. Model (4) suggests that the sunshine law 
effects are still negative and significant after controlling for both meals bans and consulting restrictions. 
The estimated effects of disclosure are smaller in comparison to those from Model (3), but the effects 
[Main Effects] 
[Interactions] 
[Double-Interaction] 
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increase to even larger magnitudes than those in Model (3) when both AMC and disclosure policies are in 
place for a given data point. This suggests that AMC policies and disclosure laws may be complementary 
and additive in nature. The meals ban also has a slight negative effect on branded prescriptions and a 
marginal positive effect on generic prescriptions. This is consistent with results from Larkin et al. (2012).  
  Consulting restrictions had no impact. These restrictions only banned honoraria (payments for 
unspecified purposes) while also requiring that consulting contracts be approved by the AMC; thus they 
have less impact than outright bans on activities such as free meals or gifts. In addition, fewer doctors 
participate in consulting, which will reduce the observed aggregate effects of consulting restrictions (per 
Campbell et al. 2010, only 14% of doctors self-report accepting speaking or consulting payments, 
compared with self-report rates of over 70% for free gifts and meals). 
 
Possible Mechanisms 
 
 The observed changes in prescriptions could be caused by changes in behavior in one or more 
different groups. The response could be driven by changes in doctor behavior (e.g., whether they accept 
meals or payments), in industry marketing behavior (e.g., whether sales reps offer meals and payments to 
doctors), in patient behavior (e.g., whether patients demand generics or switch doctors in response to 
disclosed payments), or a combination of the above. However, the most likely mechanism is through 
changes in doctor behavior.  
 These observed effects are not likely driven by patient-driven demand for changes. Importantly, 
the first set of data (for meals and payments from July 2009 – December 2009) was not published until 
November 2011. The analysis in the previous section only extends to data from July 2011, and thus all of 
the observed effects occur prior to any public release of data. These changes in prescriptions are not a 
response to any actual usage of the data, whether by patients, colleagues, hospitals, or the media. 
The effects could theoretically be driven by changes in the industry’s marketing approach. That 
is, pharmaceutical companies could have reduced meals and payments to doctors in response to disclosure 
71 
 
 
 
requirements. However, this would only occur if industry anticipated that disclosure would reduce the 
effectiveness of these tactics.19 In addition, since salespeople are generally assigned to a small 
geographical radius, such a change would require a reduction in the sales force in Massachusetts and/or a 
relocation of sales reps from Massachusetts to other states. There is no anecdotal evidence that 
pharmaceutical companies made any Massachusetts-specific alterations to detailing strategies, sales force 
size, or salesperson geographic allocation in response to this policy. In fact, scraped data from the online 
professional network LinkedIn show that pharmaceutical sales force size in Massachusetts trended 
similarly as pharmaceutical sales force sizes in other states during this timeframe. 
Most likely, the observed policy effects are driven by doctors’ fears of being perceived as biased 
or unethical in the eyes of patients, colleagues, or the public. As a result, some doctors may respond to 
disclosure by cutting off ties to industry in order to avoid having to disclose them; such a response would 
be consistent with laboratory evidence (Sah and Loewenstein 2014). This change could then lead to the 
observed changes in prescriptions in response to disclosure. Such a hypothesis would suggest that those 
doctors willing to accept and disclose payments or meals may not be as affected by the policy; I 
investigate this hypothesis in the next section. 
It is important to note that doctor-level image concerns are separate from doctor-level concerns 
over how their reputation might affect their long-term income. Since the doctors in this dataset are full-
time attendings at an academic medical center, they are generally salaried employees whose income is 
relatively independent of the number of procedures or tests they perform, or the number of patients that 
they see. In addition, patients for these doctors are driven through referrals through their AMC, so their 
patient volume is not as affected by their reputation as private practitioners’ might be. Finally, doctors in 
general seem to care about how their patients perceive them ethically, independently from any impact on 
earnings, as evidenced by doctor message board responses to other disclosure efforts (Wen 2014). 
 
                                                            
19 In addition, if industry changed their meals and payments activities prior to November 2011 (when the first set of 
data was released) then they anticipated a change in doctor response independent from release of the data. 
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Policy Effects on Massachusetts Doctors with Disclosed Industry Ties 
 
Procedure 
 The Massachusetts payments data (as summarized in Table 1) identifies which doctors accepted 
meals or consulting fees after the sunshine law was passed. Unfortunately, the data only identifies 
payments to a doctor at the year-level. In addition, due to relaxed reporting requirements in 2012 
(described earlier), there are fewer payments reported for 2012 than for previous years. Finally, the 2009 
data only contains payments from six months of data, since the law was implemented on July 1, 2009. It 
is therefore difficult to use the timing of these payments to evaluate the effect of payments on 
prescriptions trends. Instead, I use this data to classify doctors as a “consulting doctor” if they ever appear 
in the data for accepting consulting fees at any time post-law. I similarly classify doctors as a “meals 
doctor” if they appear in the data for having accepted meals. 
 
Raw Data Trends 
 Figure 6 displays the total branded prescriptions for Massachusetts doctors that accepted meals 
and Massachusetts doctors that did not accept meals, according to the disclosures data. This is compared 
to doctors in other states that were not subject to mandated disclosure. Figure 7 plots the same for doctors 
that accepted or did not accept consulting payments. Since the total number of doctors in each group is 
different, I plot average branded drugs prescribed per doctor instead of just total branded drugs prescribed 
by each group. This measure first sums each doctor’s total prescriptions that are branded in a given 
month. For each doctor group, it then finds the average branded drugs prescribed per month by equally 
weighting each doctor’s average. 
 In Figures 6 and 7, there is very little discernible difference in sunshine law effects on those that 
accepted meals or payments and those that did not. Of course, these graphs do not control for various 
fixed effects or other control variables, and they also ignore all of the drug-level information in the data. 
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Regression Results 
I run the same base regression as in Model (3), but I include interaction terms that account for 
whether a doctor is a “meals doctor” or a “consulting doctor.” Results are displayed in Table 6. Standard 
errors are again clustered at the AMC level. 
Model (5) shows the regression for meals doctors. As before, the regression demonstrates that 
doctors are significantly affected by disclosure. Specifically, doctors that did not have any meals to 
disclose decreased their branded prescriptions by 0.53 scripts per branded drug per month relative to 
counterfactual doctors. On the other hand, doctors that showed up in the database as having accepted 
meals responded to disclosure by reducing branded prescriptions by 0.73 scripts per branded drug per 
month.  
However, this difference in magnitude may simply be because meals doctors prescribe more 
branded drugs on average, which is certainly apparent from Figure 6. I therefore run an alternate 
specification in Model (5B) that uses drug-level marketshare as the dependent variable, similar to Model 
(3B). These results suggest that meals-doctors are actually affected slightly less in terms of marketshare; 
branded drugs drop in marketshare by 0.4% per branded drug for meals doctors, and by 0.5% per branded 
drug for doctors that had no meals to disclose. 
Moreover, the estimated effect of disclosure on the non-meals doctors is biased downward by the 
fact that this group includes doctors that never interacted with industry even pre-disclosure law. These 
doctors likely experienced no change in prescriptions due to disclosure, and these doctors would reduce 
the estimated average effect of the disclosure law on the entire group of non-meals doctors. When 
factoring this in, it appears that doctors that used to accept meals but stopped due to disclosure are likely 
much more affected by disclosure than those that used to accept meals and then continued to accept some 
meals post-disclosure. 
Model (6) shows a similar trend for doctors that accepted consulting payments. The sunshine law 
led to decreases in branded drug prescriptions of 0.52 scripts per month-doctor-drug for those that had no 
consulting to disclose, and 0.84 scripts for consulting doctors. Model (6B) suggests that consulting 
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doctors also showed a larger drop in branded drug marketshare in response to disclosure than those that 
had no consulting to disclose. However, as before, the majority of doctors in the no-consulting group 
likely had no consulting arrangements even pre-disclosure law; recall that only 14% of doctors self-
reported accepting such payments (Campbell et al. 2010). These doctors would significantly downward 
bias the estimated effect of disclosure on the entire group of non-consulting doctors. It is likely that the 
effect of disclosure is in actuality much larger for those that used to accept consulting but stopped in 
response to disclosure than for those that continued to accept consulting post-disclosure. 
 
Procedure – High and Low Types 
 I also define “high-meals” and “high-consulting” doctors” doctor types. These represent the 50% 
of doctors who accepted the highest total values of meals or consulting payments within this dataset. I 
then run the same regression specifications but using indicators for “high-meals” or “high-consulting” 
status instead of simply indicators for “meals doctors” or “consulting doctors.” 
 
Results – High and Low Types 
Models (7) and (8) in Table 7 show the regression results for high-meals doctors and high-
consulting doctors, respectively. Models (7B) and (8B) show the equivalent regressions using drug-
marketshare as the DV. These results show that high-meals and high-consulting doctors respond to 
disclosure fairly similarly as the full group of meals doctors and consulting doctors. 
 
Interpretation 
Taken altogether, the analysis using the actual state disclosure data suggests that doctors that 
were willing to disclose meals or consulting payments still decreased prescriptions of branded drugs 
relative to doctors in other states. Thus, there was no evidence of moral licensing among these doctors, at 
least when measured in aggregate. However, these doctors were likely also less affected by the policy 
than their Massachusetts peers who had nothing to disclose. This latter conclusion hinges on the 
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assumption that those with nothing to disclose consist of a heterogeneous mix of doctors: those that never 
accepted industry payments even pre-policy and thus would not alter their prescriptions in response to 
disclosure, and those that cut off industry payments in response to disclosure, likely leading to large 
changes in their prescriptions. 
 
Informational versus Non-Informational Influence 
  
 There is debate in the literature on whether meals and other forms of industry payments are 
informational or non-informational sources of influence on doctors. Anti-marketing groups naturally 
claim that gifts or meals have no informational content and are thus a source of non-informational 
persuasion. Industry argues that these meals are just a ticket for getting a salesperson into the door, and 
any influence from meals is a result of the information that the salespeople ultimately disperse to doctors, 
such as new clinical trials results (Carlat 2007).  
 This paper can take advantage of drug-level differences to test whether these marketing 
influences are informational in nature. In particular, new-to-the-market drugs require more information 
dissemination from manufacturers to doctors, since doctors are less familiar with the idiosyncrasies and 
details of these drugs. There is also likely a higher volume of clinical trials results being released for these 
newer drugs, leading to more information for salespeople to disseminate. If disclosure influences new-to-
the-market branded drugs differently than older branded drugs, this can shed insight on the degree to 
which this marketing influence is informational or non-informational in nature. 
In all specifications reported in this section, standard errors are again clustered at the AMC-level.  
 
Old vs. New Branded Drugs 
 Within the full seven years of this dataset, a number of branded drugs were introduced to the 
market. 58 of the branded drugs in this dataset were brought to market sometime during this time frame, 
with 38 of those hitting the market in the middle of the four-year timespan around when the disclosure 
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law was implemented (July 2007 to July 2011). I test whether disclosure differentially affects these new 
drugs relative to older branded drugs. I define a new drug as one that has been on the market for one year 
or less, although alternate cutoffs (e.g., 18 months, 24 months) also yield similar results. 
 Table 8 runs linear models that are similar to Model (3), except that an additional indicator is 
included for whether a drug is new to the market for that month (i.e., it entered the market during the time 
period of this dataset and has been on the market for 12 months or less). This indicator is also interacted 
with the sunshine law indicator. 
Model (9) suggests that newer marketed drugs are less affected by the sunshine law than older 
branded drugs. Model (9B) shows a similar finding when using drug-level marketshare as the DV; older 
branded drugs drop in marketshare by 0.6% in response to disclosure, while new-to-the-market drugs only 
drop 0.3% in marketshare. Importantly, average script volume for new-to-the-market drugs is similar (and 
in fact slightly larger) than average script volume for older branded drugs, so these effects are not driven 
by simple differences in average total volume prescribed. Altogether, these results are consistent with 
gifts and consulting payments serving as non-informational sources of influence. 
 
Discussion 
 
 This paper uses a state-level policy change to evaluate whether mandated public disclosure of 
industry-related conflicts-of-interest can alter how physicians prescribe. The results suggest that public 
disclosure reduced the prescriptions of branded drugs and increased the prescriptions of generic drugs, but 
yielding a net decrease in prescription volume. These changes likely are a consequence of changes in 
doctor-industry interactions that were brought about by the mandated disclosure requirements. 
Specifically, these disclosure requirements may have invoked social image concerns in doctors. 
Doctors are trained in the spirit of the Hippocratic Oath (i.e., “First, do no harm”), and this norm helps 
enforce a desire in doctors to avoid appearing biased or unethical in the eyes of patients, colleagues, and 
the public. Mandated disclosure may interact with this norm and encourage doctors to abstain from meals 
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and payments to avoid having to disclose such conflicts-of-interest. Since these free meals and payments 
have been shown to influence how doctors prescribe (Larkin et al. 2012), abstaining from these activities 
would then lead to the changes in prescriptions observed in this paper. In addition, these doctors’ 
concerns over their public image are not necessarily tied to concerns over the effects of reputation on 
long-term income, since the doctors in this sample are salaried employees whose income does not depend 
on the number of patients they see or the number of procedures or tests they perform. 
Alternative non-image or non-reputation explanations for the effect of disclosure are possible, but 
unlikely. Patient-driven responses could not have driven the observed results, since the state released the 
first batch of data with a two year lag, and the observed effects were evident even prior to release of the 
data. The pharmaceutical industry could have reduced payments to doctors in response to disclosure 
requirements, but this would only occur if the manufacturers anticipated that doctors would respond to 
disclosure; in addition, there is no evidence suggesting that industry responded in this way, since 
observational evidence suggests that sales force size in Massachusetts did not change in response to this 
policy. 
These social image effects are consistent with behavioral economics literature on public image 
and norm adherence. Lab experiments have shown that social image can cause individuals to conform to 
norms of fairness (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) and trust (Tadelis 2011). It stands to reason that social 
image concerns may also cause doctors to adhere to ethical norms that were emphasized to them during 
their training. It remains to be seen whether disclosure can reduce biases from conflicts-of-interest where 
ethical norms may not be as firmly entrenched through training (such as perhaps financial advising or 
political contexts). Indeed, some studies suggest that medical versus non-medical contexts can be relevant 
when measuring the effect of disclosure on biases (Sah, Loewenstein and Cain 2011). 
This paper also finds that industry influences on doctors appear to be largely non-informational in 
nature. New-to-the-market branded drugs are not disproportionately affected by the sunshine law, despite 
the fact that these drugs require more information dissemination from salespeople to doctors. This 
evidence does not accord with arguments by industry, which claim that meals are only a way to get a foot 
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in the door and not a direct source of influence unto themselves. Altogether, these results suggest that 
doctors are influenced by industry meals and consulting payments, and in at least partially a non-
informational way, but that disclosure can be effective at reducing this influence by invoking image 
concerns and causing some doctors to opt out of industry meals and payments. 
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Figure 1. Data Summary (Prior to Data Exclusions) 
Data Type Data Included (Full Eight Years) Data Selection Based on: Data Excluded 
Geographic 
Regions 
6 Metropolitan Regions: Chicago, Boston, Northern 
California, Southern California, New York, 
Pennsylvania 
AMSA’s map of AMCs in the 
U.S. All other U.S. Regions 
Academic 
Medical Centers 35 AMCs in these Metropolitan Regions 
IMAP Policy Database; 
Interviews with AMC Staff AMCs outside of these Metropolitan Regions 
Hospitals 282 hospitals and other medical centers owned or directly governed by AMCs 
Quarterly IMS survey data 
from Jan 06 – Jun 09 
All other hospitals and medical centers in the 
regions 
Drugs 377 drugs in nine drug classes IMS drug classifications; 2006-2012 IMS prescriptions data 
All other drug classes; All drugs with rarely 
prescribed during 2006-2012 
Doctors All  full-time attending doctors at AMC-owned hospitals for at least one quarter in Jan06 - Jun09 
Quarterly IMS survey data 
from Jan 06 – Jun 09 
All doctors with multiple affiliations, doctors 
that switch affiliations in 2006-2009, and 
doctors that are not full-time attendings 
Measures of 
Marketing 
Whether a drug is branded or generic; the months in 
which a branded drug had a generic version on the 
market 
FDA drug databases Other measures of marketing (e.g., journal advertisement spending, sample packs, etc.) 
Payments to 
Doctors 
All payments/gifts etc. of $50+ to Massachusetts-
licensed physicians from Jul 2009 – Dec 2012 
Disclosures made as part of the 
Massachusetts Physician 
Payments Sunshine Law 
Payments to doctors not licensed to 
Massachusetts; payments before July 2009; 
payments under $50. 
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Table 1: Payments Data Summary (Massachusetts Doctors) 
 Accepted Meals Accepted Consulting 
 Total Doctors* 
(out of 2877) 
Average Dollars 
per Doctor (SD) 
Total Doctors* 
(out of 2877) 
Average Dollars 
per Doctor (SD) 
2009 215 $209 
(204) 
198 $9,724 
(14,385) 
2010 213 $241 
(328) 
239 $12,676 
(23,779) 
2011 160 $253 
(336) 
220 $13,064 
(22,100) 
2012 28 $297 
(269) 
27 $16,752 
(18,158) 
2009-2012 430 
(616 obs) 
$235 
(291) 
370 
(684 obs) 
$12,107 
(20,707) 
*There were 4278 doctors (out of 9998) in this data affiliated with a Massachusetts AMC from July 2009 onwards. 
2877 of these remain after the data exclusions specified in the Data section. 
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Table 2. AMC Policy Changes     Legend: 
University On-site 
Gifts 
Meals Consulting Date of 
change 
NYU 1 1 0 3/29/2005 
U Penn 1 1 0 9/27/2006 
Stanford 0 1 0 10/1/2006 
U Chicago 1 1 0 7/1/2007 
UC Davis 2 1 0 7/1/2007 
UC SF 1 1 0 7/15/2007 
Boston Univ. 1 1 0 8/10/2007 
Loyola 0 0 1 10/15/2007 
Illinois at Chicago 1 1 0 12/1/2007 
Mount Sinai 1 1 1 1/1/2008 
Pittsburgh 2 1 1 2/25/2008 
UC Irvine 2 1 0 3/12/2008 
UC SD 2 1 0 3/12/2008 
Rochester 1 1 0 6/25/2008 
UC - system 2 1 0 7/1/2008 
U Mass 2 1 0 7/1/2008 
Columbia 1 1 0 1/1/2009 
Rush 2 1 1 1/29/2009 
Stony Brook 1 1 0 3/23/2009 
Temple 1 1 0 6/15/2009 
Rosalind Franklin 2 1 0 6/17/2009 
U Nevada 1 0 0 7/6/2009 
Southern Calif. 1 1 1 9/1/2009 
Partners Health 2 2 1 10/1/2009 
UC LA 2 1 0 10/7/2009 
NY Med. Coll. 0 2 0 1/10/2010 
Northwestern 2 1 0 1/25/2010 
SUNY Upstate 2 1 0 2/1/2010 
Tufts 1 0 0 4/5/2010 
SUNY Downstate 1 1 0 4/21/2010 
Stanford 2 1 1 7/22/2010 
Boston Univ. 1 1 1 1/7/2011 
Yeshiva 0 1 0 6/15/2011 
Harvard 1 1 0 7/1/2011 
Rochester 2 1 0 10/10/2011 
Cornell - - - - 
UMDNJ/RWJ - - - - 
NYCOM - - - - 
Western Univ. - - - - 
Thomas Jefferson - - - - 
On-Site Gifts: 
0: PhRMA regulations; <$100 per visit 
1: Personal gifts banned 
2: Personal and educational gifts banned  
     (e.g., medical textbooks, etc.) 
 
Meals: 
0: PhRMA regulations; <$100 per visit 
1: Banned on campus except for ACCME* 
2: Banned everywhere except for ACCME* 
 
*ACCME = Accreditation Council for 
Continuing Medical Education 
 
Consulting: 
0: No restrictions 
1: No honoraria^; contracts require 
department approval; pay must be fair market 
value for specified services. 
 
^honoraria = payments for unspecified 
purposes
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Figure 2: Total Branded Rx (Four Years) 
 
 
  
The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
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The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
Figure 2B: Total Branded Rx (Close-Up)  
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The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
Note that shrinking distance between groups (the red circled region) is caused by psych-drugs coming off patent; there are more 
physicians that regularly prescribed psychotherapeutic drugs in Massachusetts than in the control states. 
Figure 3: Total Branded Rx (Seven Years) 
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The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
Figure 3B: Total Branded Rx (non-Psych Drugs only) 
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The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
Figure 4: Total Branded Rx (Always On Patent Only, Seven Years) 
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The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
Figure 4B: Total Branded Rx (Always On Patent Only) 
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Figure 5: Total Generic Rx (Four Years) 
Sunshine Law 
Implemented
Sunshine Law 
Signed
 
The “MA” group includes all 2877 doctors that are affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
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Table 3: Sunshine Effects, OLS (Doctor-Month) 
 
 (1) (2) 
DV Branded Rx Generic Rx 
N (Doctor-Month) 275,112 275,112 
Doctors 5,755 5,755 
Sunshine law 
 
-2.249** 
(1.061) 
2.497* 
(1.394) 
   
Doctor, Month FE YES YES 
                     *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
             SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
 
  
93 
 
 
 
Table 4: Sunshine Effects, OLS (Doctor-Drug-Month) 
 (3) (3B) 
DV Rx Drug-Marketshare 
N (doctor-drug-month) 7,541,535 7,237,375 
Doctors 5,755 5,755 
Policies   
    1. Sunshine 
 
0.071 
(0.063) 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
Interactions   
    2. Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.635*** 
(0.082) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Controls   
    Branded Drug Indicator YES YES 
    Doctor*Drug, Month FE YES YES 
Linear combinations of coefficients   
1 + 2 
 
-0.564** 
(0.104) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
              *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
              SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
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Table 5: Sunshine + AMC Effects (OLS) 
 
DV = Rx (4) 
N (doctor-drug-month) 7,541,535 
Doctors 5,755 
Policies  
   1. Meals Ban 0.091* 
(0.052) 
   2. Consulting Restrictions 
 
0.062 
(0.116) 
   3. Sunshine Law 
 
0.099 
(0.076) 
Interactions  
   4. Meals*Branded 
 
-0.249*** 
(0.075) 
   5. Consulting*Branded 
 
-0.069 
(0.095) 
   6. Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.540*** 
(0.058) 
   7. Meals*Sunshine 
 
-0.060 
(0.086) 
   8. Consulting*Sunshine 
 
-0.079 
(0.121) 
Double-Interactions  
   9. Meals*Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.068 
(0.073) 
   10. Consulting*Sunshine*Branded 0.239 
(0.150) 
Controls  
    Branded Drug Indicator YES 
    Doctor*Drug, Month FE YES 
Linear combinations of coefficients  
   1 + 4 
 
-0.157** 
(0.069) 
   2 + 5 
 
-0.007 
(0.085) 
   3 + 6 
 
-0.442*** 
(0.107) 
   1 + 3 + 7  
 
0.130* 
(0.076) 
   2 + 3 + 8 
 
0.081 
(0.074) 
   1 + 3 + 4 + 6 + 7 + 9 
 
-0.726*** 
(0.087) 
   2 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 10 
 
-0.289 
(0.210) 
         *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
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                                Figure 6: Branded Rx Per Doctor, Meals 
Sunshine Law 
Implemented 
Sunshine Law 
Signed
 
The “MA – Accepted Meals” group includes 430 doctors that accepted meals per the sunshine law data. 
The “MA – No Meals” group includes 2447 MA doctors that didn’t accept any meals per the sunshine law data. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
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                              Figure 7: Branded Rx Per Doctor, Consulting 
 
Sunshine Law 
Implemented 
Sunshine Law 
Signed
The “MA – Accepted Consulting” group includes 370 doctors that accepted consulting payments per the sunshine law data. 
The “MA – No Consulting” group includes 2407 MA doctors that didn’t accept any consulting payments per the sunshine law data. 
The “Other” group includes the 2878 doctors that are not affiliated with a MA AMC when the sunshine law was implemented. 
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Table 6: Policy Effects (OLS) on Massachusetts Doctors, by Doctor Type 
 
 (5) (6) (5B) (6B) 
DV Rx Rx Marketshare Marketshare
N (doctor-drug-month) 7,541,535 7,541,535 7,237,375 7,237,375 
Doctors 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 
Policies     
   1. Sunshine 
 
0.085 
(0.078) 
0.107 
(0.066) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Interactions     
   2. Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.610*** 
(0.090) 
-0.632*** 
(0.079) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   3. Sunshine*Meals-Doc 
 
-0.005 
(0.231) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 
   4. Sunshine*Consult-Doc 
 
 -0.290** 
(0.133) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
   5. Meals-Doc*Branded 
 
0.904 
(0.542) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 
   6.Consult-Doc*Branded 
 
 0.015 
(0.479) 
 -0.006** 
(0.003) 
Double-Interaction     
   7. Sunshine*Branded*Meals-Doc 
 
-0.202 
(0.171) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
 
   8. Sunshine*Branded*Consult-Doc  -0.027 
(0.176) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
Controls     
    Branded Drug Indicator YES YES YES YES 
    Doctor*Drug, Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Linear combinations of coeff     
    1 + 2 
 
-0.525*** 
(0.108) 
-0.524*** 
(0.092) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
    1 + 2 + 3 + 7 
 
-0.732*** 
(0.106) 
 -0.004** 
(0.002) 
 
    1 + 2 + 4 + 8 
 
 -0.842** 
(0.222) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
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Table 7: Policy Effects (OLS) on High-Meals and High-Consulting Doctors 
  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
  SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (7) (8) (7B) (8B) 
DV Rx Rx Marketshare Marketshare
N (doctor-drug-month) 7,541,535 7,541,535 7,237,375 7,237,375 
Doctors 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 
Policies     
   1. Sunshine 
 
0.052 
(0.072) 
0.086 
(0.062) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Interactions     
   2. Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.611*** 
(0.079) 
-0.628*** 
().077) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   3. Sunshine*High-Meals 
 
0.332 
(0.334) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
   4. Sunshine*High-Consulting 
 
 -0.220*** 
(0.042) 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
   5. High-Meals*Branded 
 
1.291 
(0.834) 
 
 -0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
   6. High-Consulting*Branded 
 
 0.293 
(0.683) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Double-Interaction     
   7. Sunshine*Branded*High-Meals 
 
-0.375 
(0.295) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 
   8. Sunshine*Branded*High-Consulting  -0.142 
(0.312) 
 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
Controls     
    Branded Drug Indicator YES YES YES YES 
    Doctor*Drug, Month FE YES YES YES YES 
Linear combinations of coeff     
    1 + 2 
 
-0.559*** 
(0.102) 
-0.541*** 
(0.096) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
    1 + 2 + 3 + 7 
 
-0.602*** 
(0.175) 
 -0.005* 
(0.002) 
 
    1 + 2 + 4 + 8 
 
 -0.904** 
(0.373) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
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Table 8: Sunshine Law Effects on New Branded Drugs 
 (9) (9B) 
DV Rx Marketshare 
N (doctor-drug-month) 7,541,535 7,237,375 
Doctors 5,755 5,755 
Policies   
   1. Sunshine 
 
0.039 
(0.063) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Drug Type   
   2. New Branded Drug -0.224*** 
(0.037) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Interactions   
   3. Sunshine*Branded 
 
-0.788*** 
(0.097) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
   4. Sunshine*New Branded 
 
0.463*** 
(0.050) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Controls   
    Branded Drug Indicator YES YES 
    Doctor*Drug, Month FE YES YES 
Linear combinations of coeff   
   1 + 3 
 
-0.748*** 
(0.121) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
   1 + 3 + 4 -0.285*** 
(0.089) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
         *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
         SEs are robust and clustered by AMC. 
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
 
I. Introduction 
  
Many non-profits offer incentives during fundraising drives to increase a prospective donor’s 
motivation to give. Common incentives include matching donations or challenges, where third party 
benefactors make a contribution depending on whether certain goals are reached by other donors (Dove 
2001). Many non-profits also use simpler and more direct economic incentives, such as offering small 
thank-you gifts to those that donate. However, while such thank-you gifts are recommended by many 
fundraising guidebooks (e.g., Dove 2001, Greenfield 2002), there is no clear empirical evidence that they 
are effective.  
In fact, evidence from psychology suggests that economic incentives may interact with and 
reduce intrinsic incentives to donate (Deci 1971), making it possible for thank-you gifts to decrease 
donations. Indeed, some laboratory results suggest that thank-you gifts can decrease donations in certain 
fundraising contexts (Newman and Shen 2012). Similarly, there are economic models that suggest 
charitable donations are a self-signaling device for traits such as altruism; economic incentives can 
obscure the value of that self-signal and therefore decrease the likelihood of a donation (Benabou and 
Tirole 2006).  
This study uses a large-scale field experimental design to measure how thank-you gifts can 
influence donation rates and amounts. In collaboration with a public radio station, I run a direct-mail field 
experiment that randomly varies whether prospective donors are offered a thank-you gift in exchange for 
a donation. The control group receives no thank-you gift offer, and the treatment group receives an offer 
of a thermos in exchange for a donation at or above a specific amount. An additional treatment group is 
instead offered a pro-social thank-you gift that only benefits others: the radio station will offer to donate 
meals to a food bank on the donor’s behalf if they donate to the radio station. This pro-social gift can help 
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identify whether crowding out is related to self-signaling, since this gift introduces no direct economic 
incentive to the donor to interfere with the self-signal value of the donation.  
I find that donation rates decreased relative to controls when thank-you gifts were offered by 
direct-mail. This occurred with both types of thank-you gifts. 6.2% of donors in control treatments chose 
to donate, while only 4.3% of donors chose to donate in each of the gift treatments.1 Furthermore, the 
percentage of donations made that were at or above the minimum required to qualify for the gift were 
unchanged from treatment to control; additionally, only 5 total  donors in the treatment conditions (out of 
66 that qualified for the gift) opted for the gift. Average donation amounts, conditional on donating, did 
not increase in treatment groups; if anything, average donation amounts were higher in the control group.  
My results suggest that extrinsic incentives can interact with the intrinsic motives that are present 
in a non-profit fundraising context. Under certain conditions, such as those present in this study, this 
interaction can lead to motivation crowding out. This result contrasts with standard economic 
assumptions about relative price effects, which typically assume that marginal increases in extrinsic 
incentives should always weakly increase utility (Solow 1971; Arrow 1972).  
These results suggest against a self-signaling mechanism for crowding out. First, the meals gift 
had a negative effect on donations, even though it provided no extrinsic incentive to the donor that would 
decrease the self-signaling value of the donation. Second, since gifts are always opt-in, donors concerned 
with self-signaling can simply refuse the gift and be at least as well off from a self-signaling standpoint as 
if no gift had been offered. 
Instead, the results suggest that crowding out in this context may simply be due to attention and 
mindset. The direct-mail inserts called attention to both the gift and the donation amount required to be 
eligible for the gift. The inserts simultaneously detracted attention away from the intrinsic motives for 
donating, which were emphasized in the actual solicitation letter. This change in attention can cause 
donors to place more weight on the gift incentive (which is not a favorable incentive when compared to 
                                                            
1 These figures are based on the first time each donor was eligible to receive a gift offer by mail. Donors that did not 
respond to this first solicitation were solicited by mail in subsequent months as well, and these data were not 
included in the analysis; however, including them will yield the exact same conclusions. 
102 
 
 
 
the required donation amount to be eligible), while also causing donors to place less weight on the 
intrinsic reasons to donate. Moreover, this change in attention can lead to a change in mindset (Gneezy, 
Li, Saccardo, and Samek 2014; Newman and Savary 2014), such as causing donors to view the donation 
in a cost-benefit mindset instead of a pro-social mindset. Since the cost-benefit terms for the gift are not 
favorable in this study (e.g., $180 for a thermos), this would also reduce donation rates. 
From a practical perspective, if a non-profit chooses to give gifts, it must consider whether the 
economic benefits of the gift are enough to overcome possible negative crowding out effects. In many 
field experiments, the use of economic incentives actually increased pro-social actions in donors 
(Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim 2012, 2014); this may simply be because the economic incentives in these 
tests were desirable enough to overcome any crowding out effects. Alternatively, the saliency of the gift 
may also vary across these studies, also leading to variation in the degree of crowding out that might 
occur. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the relevant literature on both 
motivation crowding out and fundraising strategies. Section III analyzes the direct-mail membership 
renewal campaigns, including using donor attributes based on archival donation histories. Section IV 
discusses the cognitive mechanisms that may be driving the observed treatment effects. Section V 
examines a follow-up online experiment that tests the mechanisms directly. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Related Literature 
 
Crowding Out 
 Motivation crowding out has been well-studied in cognitive psychology. Edward Deci (1971) 
first demonstrated that providing extrinsic motivation can reduce self-perceived intrinsic motivation on a 
task; in particular, Deci’s subjects showed less intrinsic interest in a puzzle task if they had previously 
been compensated for working on the same task. Subsequent studies replicated this effect in other 
contexts (see Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999 for summaries), and some of these studies alternately termed 
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this effect the “over-justification effect” (Lepper, Green and Nisbett 1973) and “cognitive evaluation 
theory” (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999) among other names. 
At around the same time as Deci’s seminal study, the social scientist Richard Titmuss (1970) 
published his influential book The Gift Relationship, where he hypothesized that paying people to give 
blood can potentially decrease donation rates. Titmuss’ hypothesis spawned a stream of field experiments, 
to mixed results (Ferrari et al. 1985; Reich et al. 2006; Mellstrom and Johannesson 2008; Goette and 
Stutzer 2008; Costa-Font, Jofre-Bonet and Yen 2012; Niza, Tung and Marteau 2013; Lacetera, Macis and 
Slonim 2012 and 2014).  
Economic models have accounted for crowding out by allowing for interactions between extrinsic 
and intrinsic incentives (Frey and Jegen 2001). For instance, a field experiment showed that individuals 
offered low pay for a task were less likely to complete the task than if they were offered no pay at all 
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Other studies suggested that financial incentives can crowd out willingness 
to volunteer (Frey and Goette 1999), to conform to a social norm (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000), or to perform a civic duty (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Non-monetary forms of 
extrinsic incentives, such as institutional rules and regulations, can also crowd out willingness to perform 
a civic duty (Frey 1997) or to adhere to a norm (Bohnet, Frey and Huck 2001). 
Like these other studies, I use a field experiment to test for relationships between intrinsic and 
extrinsic incentives. However, instead of the contexts studied in previous papers, I examine whether 
extrinsic incentives can crowd out one’s willingness to donate money to a non-profit. Importantly, this 
could cause extrinsic incentives (such as a conditional gift) to be viewed as akin to a purchase, which is 
not possible when the action in question is a service or duty (such as giving blood). A laboratory study 
has investigated crowding out in this fundraising context (Newman and Shen 2012); however, aside from 
being limited to a lab setting, their study does not use optional gifts or pro-social gifts, and thus it cannot 
test whether crowding out is driven by self-signaling or by alternative mechanisms. 
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Charitable Giving 
Field experiments have been used to test other common fundraising strategies. These include 
donation matching (Karlan and List 2007; Meier 2007), donation seeding, (List and Lucking-Reiley 
2002), and social pressure tactics (DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2012, 2013; Andreoni, Rao and 
Trachtman 2012), among others. Falk (2006) tests whether unconditional gifts from a non-profit can 
increase donations and shows that large gifts increased giving rates by 75%, while small gifts increased 
giving rates by 17%.2 However, this strategy varies in a subtle but important way from thank-you gifts in 
fundraising: Falk invokes reciprocity by giving unconditional gifts that precede the solicitation request, 
which can cause the gift to be perceived differently than if they were conditional on donating.  
Eckel, Herberich, and Meer (2014) run a similar test on gifts by collaborating with Texas A&M 
University. The authors use direct-mail to solicit Texas A&M alumni for donations, and they offer 
conditional opt-in or opt-out luggage tags in exchange for donations. They find no effects of conditional 
gifts on donations. However, their study was designed to measure possible positive effects of gifts on 
donations, and the test was not geared towards detecting crowding out.  As a result, they offered the gift 
in exchange for any donation amount (even $1 or $5 donations); this favorable gift-to-donation value ratio 
makes crowding out more difficult to detect, since the high value of the gift (relative to donations) may 
cancel out any crowding out effects. In addition, their study targeted prospective first-time donors or 
lapsed donors, yielding a donation rate of less than 1%. This decreased statistical power and decreased the 
strength of the null effect that they found. 
Like these other studies, I use a field setting to evaluate the efficacy of a commonly used 
fundraising strategy. Unlike Eckel, Herberich, and Meer (2014), I specifically implement an experiment 
designed to test whether conditional items can crowd out intrinsic motivation to give. I use conditions that 
are more conducive for detecting crowding out, such as requiring a significant minimum donation to 
obtain the gift and a gift-to-donation value ratio of 1:10, which is similar to many industry standards. My 
                                                            
2In addition, the gift items in Falk (2006) were postcards drawn by needy children who were supported by the non-
profit. These gifts may invoke not only reciprocity but also empathy, so the results are not a pure reciprocity effect. 
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study also focuses on renewal candidates who have given in the past instead of prospective first-time 
donors, yielding donation rates much higher than 1% and generating sufficient statistical power to test for 
crowding out.  
III. Direct-Mail Renewal Tests 
 
Background 
 I collaborate with a non-profit public radio station to test for the effects of conditional thank-you 
gifts during the station’s rolling direct-mail membership renewal fundraising campaign. The station 
defines a member as any individual that has contributed any amount, in any fundraising campaign, within 
the past twelve months. When a donor’s membership is three months from expiration, the donor is 
solicited by mail to renew.3 Unless the member renews, the renewal letters will continue to be mailed – 
one per month – up through the fifteenth month beyond their last donation; in other words, the member 
could receive donation letters each month when they are between nine and fifteen months removed from 
their last donation. (See Table 1 for the abbreviations that the station uses to refer to each of these months 
within the membership cycle, and which this paper will also adopt for brevity’s sake). 
 The renewal letter is a short, 1-page solicitation message thanking the member for their past 
support and requesting a new donation to renew the membership. The solicitation letter also reminds 
donors of the many reasons why they donate, such as the station’s original programming and the NPR 
content that they broadcast. The letter includes a detachable remit form (see Figure 1) that donors can 
mail back in order to renew their membership. These remit forms contain a unique identifier that allows 
the station to track exactly which mailing the donor is responding to. The suggested donation amounts 
listed on the remit form typically depended on the amount the donor has donated in past years. 
 
 
 
                                                            
3The only exceptions are the very few members who requested a “do-not-mail” designation (<1% of active donors). 
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Procedure 
 Testing was run by direct-mail from May–July 2014. The standard solicitation letter contains no 
reference to thank-you gifts, and this was used for the control group. For treatment groups, the same letter 
was sent, but a colored buck-slip insert was also included in the envelope that advertised one of two 
possible thank-you gifts (see Figure 1 for a black and white image of the slips). One treatment group 
received an offer of a swag gift item in exchange for a $180+ donation, which in this test was a tumbler 
(i.e., a thermos). A second treatment group received an offer of a meals gift item for a $180+ donation, 
which in this test meant the station would offer to donate 60 meals to the local food bank on the donor’s 
behalf. Both gifts have a fair market value of $15, although this was not stated in the gift offer. 
  The remit forms attached to these letters were the same across all three conditions. For most 
donors, the suggested amounts listed on the remit form were $120, $180, and $240, although some donors 
saw suggested amounts of $25 and $89.4 In treatment conditions, the remit form is simply altered to 
include a check-box for selecting the thank-you gift, but all other aspects of the remit form remained 
identical across conditions.5 
 In each month, all renewal members were randomly split into three conditions: control, swag, and 
meals. In the first month of testing, May 2014, all members scheduled to receive a mailer (that is, any 
member that was nine to fifteen months removed from their most recent donation) were randomly 
assigned to one of the three conditions. The parent company responsible for the randomization split 
approximately half of the subjects into the control group, and then split the remainder 50/50 between 
swag and meals treatments. In the second and third months of testing (June and July 2014), all new R1 
members were randomly distributed across all three groups in similar fashion.6  
                                                            
4 The station was testing a new ask string with the lower suggested amounts of $25 and $89 for donors that gave 
very low amounts in the past. Randomization of treatment assignment ensured that the ask strings were evenly and 
randomly distributed across treatment groups. 
5 To equate the gift conditions, donors were not asked to pay for shipping costs if they selected the thermos. 
6 Some control subjects who had been solicited in May were randomly assigned to new groups in June if they did 
not respond to the May mailer; the station did not require that they remain in the same treatment every month. They 
were still randomly assigned, and robustness checks show that all reported results also hold when running only on 
May data, before any treatment re-assignment. 
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Data  
 Over these three months, a total of 19,636 pieces of direct-mail were sent to 10,232 unique 
members about renewing their membership. Figure 2A breaks down the number of mailers sent by month 
and condition. Although more donors were assigned to the control group than the other groups, the 
process was random (the station randomized approximately 50% of all subjects to the control group). 
Figure 2B breaks down the mailers according to the renewal cycle. R1 refers to donors who are nine 
months removed from their last donation and receiving a mailer for the first time in 2014. Similarly, R2 
donors are those receiving a second mailer this year; note that R2 donors in May would have received a 
mailer in April, but would not have been eligible for a gift offer until May, when the experiment began.  
 I limit the data to observations where a donor was eligible to receive a gift offer for the first time. 
This includes all donors solicited in May, as well as the R1 donors in June and July. These observations 
are outlined in red in Figure 2B. This avoids confounds that would otherwise arise from including more 
than one observation for each donor. For instance, donors essentially self-select into receiving multiple 
mailers by choosing to ignore the first mailer, and thus these donors would be weighted too heavily in any 
analysis that treats every mailer as an independent observation. In addition, the station would sometimes 
re-assign donors to a different condition if they did not respond to the first mailer; while the re-
assignment was still random amongst the remaining conditions, this could also introduce bias if not 
treated carefully. I avoid these confounds by simply using the restricted data specified, although all 
results in this paper are robust to using the entire dataset (see appendix). 
 Figure 3 demonstrates that the randomization process was generally successful. In aggregate, 
subjects showed similar distributions in demographics, including race, gender, and age. 7  Recent donation 
histories also seem fairly similar across conditions, although this historical data was rather noisy and thus 
hard to parse.8 The average number of pledges and the average pledge amount from the past year were 
                                                            
7 Gender and race data were inferred using U.S. national Census data from 1990 and 2000 on surname-race statistics 
and name-gender statistics. 
8 In particular, a single pledge would sometimes be split into multiple observations in the archival data, making both 
total-pledges and average-donations-per-pledge difficult to determine. In addition, both pledge and payments data 
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generally similar across conditions. However, compared to the treatment subjects, control subjects were 
more likely to have donated by phone or mail than by web. This is likely because older donors are less 
likely to give by web, and due to randomness the control subjects happened to be very slightly older on 
average than those in the treatment groups. Nevertheless, controlling for these slight differences in groups 
will still yield similar results, as will be shown in the Results section. 
 
Main Results 
 Figure 4 displays summary statistics by condition and difference-in-means t-tests between 
conditions. 6.2% of donors in the control group chose to donate by mail, while 4.2% and 4.3% of donors 
in the meals and swag conditions chose to donate. These differences-in-means are significant at the 
p<0.01 level, suggesting that donors were less likely to donate (by almost 33%) when offered either type 
of gift. Since I have no data on whether donors actually opened the envelope and saw the buck-slip that 
advertised the gift, these regressions represent intend-to-treat effects. Actual treatment effects on the 
treated are likely even larger than observed. 
 Table 2 reports standard OLS estimates of how thank-you gifts affected renewal rates. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator representing whether a donor chose to donate in response to the 
mailer. In Model (1), the regressor of interest is an indicator for whether any thank-you gift was offered; 
in Model (2), the regressors of interest are binary indicators for whether a swag item or meals item was 
offered. I also include month fixed effects to account for seasonality trends. Both models suggest that 
thank-you gifts significantly decreased donation rates. Although the coefficient sizes are small, they 
suggest a decrease in giving rate similar to what is observed in Figure 4. 
 Since the dependent variable is binary, Table 2 also reports logistic regressions as a robustness 
check. I present OLS as my main results because they do not yield out-of-sample predictions. 
Nevertheless, the standard logistic regression in Model (3) yields similar results as before. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
were recorded as separate observations within the dataset, yielding multiple observations for each donation; while 
pledges and payments were flagged separately, the data did not always add up correctly for all donors. 
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Model (4) uses a penalized maximum likelihood logistic model that accounts for the fact that donation 
rates are relatively rare events; this specification is typically reserved for samples with very few 
occurrences of a particular outcome, e.g. 200 or fewer of a particular outcome (Allison 2012). This is not 
particularly applicable in this instance, since I have over 500 decisions to donate. Nevertheless, results are 
also robust to this alternate specification, and yield very close results to the standard logit in Model (3).  
In future regressions, I will report only OLS for ease of interpretation, and because they never yield out-
of-sample predictions.  
 Figure 5 examines whether average pledge amounts differ between treatments, conditional on 
choosing to donate. A total of 509 mailers resulted in donations, with average donations of $107 for 
donors in the control condition, $96 for donors in the swag treatment, and $94 for donors in the meals 
treatment. This suggests that, if anything, gift offers led to lower donations on average. Consistent with 
this, 4.3% of donors in each of the gift groups donated at least $180 (the minimum required to be eligible 
for a gift in the gift treatments), compared to 5.8% of donors in the control group, suggesting that the 
$180 threshold did not cause donors to give at the threshold more frequently. Even conditional on 
donating, donors in the gift groups did not give at the threshold more often; 9.9% of those that donated in 
the swag group and 8.3% of those that donated in the meals group gave at or above the threshold, 
compared to 9.3% of those that donated in the control group. Not surprisingly, this is in part because 
donors were not particularly tempted by the gifts. Of those that gave enough to qualify for the gift, only 
four out of ten accepted the meals gift, and only one out of thirteen accepted the swag gift. 
 Table 3 reports regression results with conditional pledge amount as the dependent variable, and 
also includes month fixed effects. Models (5) and (6) only include observations where pledges were 
made. Model (5) uses OLS to demonstrate that average donation amounts were not different between 
treatment and control. Model (6) uses OLS to show that the likelihood of donating at least $180 was not 
different between groups. Together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that in this three month test period, the gift 
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offers decreased total donations by approximately $12000, which equates to approximately 15% of the 
total amount (~$80k) raised during this three-month mailer campaign.9 
 Since the mail renewal campaign is ongoing year-round, the first month of testing (May 2014) 
included donors from all parts of the renewal cycle. That is, it included some donors that had already 
received mail solicitation letters in April 2014 or before, but are still receiving mailers in May because 
they did not respond to the previous mailers. Since donors self-select into receiving these repeat mailers, 
it makes sense to control for the number of mailers each donor had received when the test began. Figure 6 
shows donation rates by treatment and renewal-month status; R1 stands for the first time a donor is 
receiving a mailer this year, R2 is the second time, and so forth. The figure shows that, while there is 
significant variation in donation rates by Renewal Month, R1 donors are driving most of the observed 
crowding out effects.10 The red stars above some of the treatment group bars represent the p-values for 
two-tailed difference-in-means t-tests between that group and the relevant control group.  
 Table 4A displays OLS regressions that control for renewal-month status or interact it with 
treatment indicators. I use binary indicators for R2 through R7 (R1 is the omitted indicator). Model (9) 
shows that gift effects are still significant when controlling for renewal-month status, without 
interactions.11 Model (10) adds interactions between renewal-month status and treatment. While many of 
these interaction terms are significant, they only denote the additional incremental effect of treatment on a 
donor in that particular Renewal Month; the net effect of treatment is actually represented by the linear 
combination of the main effect of treatment plus the relevant interaction term. Table 4B displays the 
relevant linear combinations of effects for Model (10), and these linear combinations demonstrate that gift 
effects are only present in R1-meals, R1-swag, and R6-swag.12  
                                                            
9 There were 5,874 treatment mailers. Average pledges were $101 across all conditions, and Table 3 cannot reject 
the null that average donations were the same across treatments. Table 2 suggests that donation rates dropped 2% in 
response to gift offers. This leads to an estimated decrease in donations of about $12000. 
10 Note that if a donor gives during their R1 month, their donation renews their membership for 12 months from the 
date their current membership expires (and not 12 months from their new donation date). 
11 These results are even stronger when pooling both treatments into a single indicator representing any gift offered. 
12 These are linear combinations (i.e., joint significance tests) of the Swag and Meals indicators with the relevant 
Renewal-month*Treatment interaction coefficient. 
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These latter results suggest that once a donor has chosen to ignore the first mailer they receive, 
the gift offer no longer matters in subsequent mailers. This may be because these donors have chosen not 
to donate regardless; they may also disproportionately represent individuals who are not opening the 
mailers. This group also includes individuals who choose to wait until R4 to donate (the twelve month 
mark, when their membership officially expires). However, note that if you donate in a month prior to R4, 
your membership is extended by the full 12 months from the month your membership expires, and not the 
month that you donated. 
 
Results by Sub-Groups 
 One concern, as illustrated in Figure 3, is the fact that some donor-level traits seemed to vary 
slightly across groups, despite the randomization. In particular, control groups seem slightly older, 
slightly more Caucasian, and slightly more likely to give by mail or phone (and slightly less likely to give 
by web). The most important difference is in the rate of donating by mail, since this is the factor most 
likely to influence base donation rates across groups. This difference in donation method is likely related 
to the slight difference in age across groups, as older donors tend to prefer giving by mail or phone more-
so than younger donors. This difference resulted in double- and triple-checking of the randomization 
process, which nevertheless seems valid; donors scheduled to receive a mailer (based simply on their last 
donation made) were randomized into groups at the individual level via a random-number style algorithm. 
 Table 5 displays OLS regressions that control for these factors. Model (11) uses an indicator to 
represent whether they gave by mail in 2013, and also interacts this indicator with each treatment. Month 
and Renewal-Month fixed effects are included.13 The main effects of Swag and Meals show that those 
that did not give by mail in the past year did experience crowding out; they were 1.3% and 1.4% less 
likely to donate if offered the Meals and Swag items, respectively. Not surprisingly, any donor that gave 
by mail in the past year was much more likely to donate by mail again this year (9.7% more likely, 
regardless of condition). The linear combination terms suggest that those that gave by mail in the past 
                                                            
13 Results are robust to excluding these. 
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year also experienced crowding out when offered the meals gift; the swag gift also showed near marginal 
significance for crowding out (p <0.12). Thus, both those that gave by mail in 2013 and those that did 
not’ seem to show some crowding out in response to gift offers. 
 Model (12) splits the donors by race, since the control group showed a potentially slightly higher 
ratio of Caucasians. I include a variable for Caucasian that corresponds to a value between 0 and 1, 
representing the likelihood that the given donor’s last name represents a Caucasian ethnicity. I interact 
this with each treatment variable. The results suggest that Caucasian donors drive the crowding out results 
in both gift treatments. However, this may simply be driven by sample size, since approximately three-
fourths of all donors in the dataset (in each condition) are Caucasian. Nonetheless, it is useful to note that 
the treatment groups had slightly lower rates of Caucasians, and yet still demonstrated crowding out in 
that group, suggesting that any bias from the small difference in race distribution across groups would 
bias against finding a crowding out effect. 
 Model (13) includes a variable to capture donor age. The radio station obtained age data by 
purchasing a consumer behavior dataset from a third party vendor, which matched donor names and 
addresses to publicly available data sources on age. Only approximately 75% of donors in the dataset 
were matched, so regressions including age drop approximately 25% of the data. Model (13) includes a 
measure of age that is normalized between 0 and 1. This Model shows main effects of treatment that are 
still negative, but not near significance; likewise, the linear combinations suggest that the effects are 
essentially zero for the oldest in the data (the reported linear combinations represent treatment effects on 
the hypothetical 100-year old donor). There may be several reasons for the lack of statistical significance 
in these results; first, as mentioned, the regression drops 25% o the data for having no age data. Second, 
there is likely significant noise in the age data; the oldest matches in the data were above 110 years of 
age, which is unlikely to be accurate (indeed, although I called the linear combination effects a 
representation of the hypothetical 100-year old donor, there are donors in the dataset with a calculated age 
of 100). Although all ages of 100+ were dropped, there may still be mismatches elsewhere in the data that 
may be confounding results. 
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Results Based on Past Thank-You Gift Behavior 
 Importantly, the station has offered thank-you gifts in the past – just never by mail. The station 
has offered thank-you gifts through on-air advertisements and on their online donations page since at least 
2007. Thus, their archival data includes information on whether donors have accepted similar thank-you 
gifts in the past, including the meals gift. Importantly, since they have never been offered by mail before, 
donors would not have forestalled the gift offer that was included in the direct-mail experiment. I use this 
information on past thank-you gifts to estimate crowding out effects among different donor types. Those 
that have accepted gifts in the past could conceivably respond positively to gifts, while those that have 
never accepted a gift could be the ones driving the observed crowding out effects.  
 Table 6 re-analyzes the direct-mail field experiment using additional information from the 
archival data. I run the same base linear models as before, but I run them separately on those that have 
ever accepted a thank-you gift in the past, and those that have never done so.14 These regressions are 
Models (14) and (15), respectively. These results show that crowding out is driven primarily by those that 
did not accept a thank-you gift when they first joined as a member; for these donors, swag and meals gifts 
caused decreases of 2.0% and 2.3% in donation rates, respectively. Those that have accepted gifts in the 
past showed no crowding out effects, although the coefficients still skewed negative. Importantly, those 
that have accepted gifts before did not respond positively to gift offers, even when the gift was an item 
that they would likely still want even if they had selected the item in prior years (i.e., the meals gift).  
 Donors that have accepted thank-you gifts in the past are more likely to have given via the web in 
the past (since traditionally that is the only type of donation that offered gifts, although there are 
nonetheless plenty of exceptions in the station’s history). Models (16) and (17) control for this by 
including an indicator for whether a donor has ever given via web, and interacting this indicator with 
treatment. The results show that the results from Models (14) and (15) are robust to controlling for 
whether a donor has given by web in the past, although crowding out is driven primarily by those that 
                                                            
14 Results are the same when running the specification on all donors and using main effect and interaction terms to 
separate donor types. I present the results as separate regressions for ease of interpretation. 
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have never given by web before (this is partly a sample size effect, since those that have never given by 
web represent a majority of the donors in the dataset). 
 
IV. Cognitive Mechanisms 
 
 The observed negative effects run counter to standard economic concepts. Unlike standard 
marginal price effects, adding economic incentives appears to decrease donor response. There are several 
possible theories that can explain parts of the results in this paper, but only one theory that can 
convincingly explain every result. 
 Benabou and Tirole (2006) model motivation to donate as a self-signaling mechanism. In their 
words, “it [is] rational to define oneself partly through one’s past choices: ‘I am the kind of person who 
behaves in this way.’” This implies that donors give in part so that they can then tell themselves that “I am 
the kind of person who donates money to benefit a public radio station.” A reward offer will dilute the 
value of this self-signal, since donors may instead view the signal as “I am the kind of person who 
donates money in order to receive a thermos.”  Thus, for the gift to help donation rates, it must present 
greater utility to the individual than the decrease in utility caused by a dilution of the self-signaling value 
of the donation. 
 There are two reasons why this self-signaling interpretation cannot explain these results. First, it 
is not clear why the meals gift would dilute the self-signaling value of a donation, since it does not offer 
direct economic utility to the donor. Second, the fact that the reward is opt-in should theoretically provide 
donors the opportunity to avoid diluting the value of the self-signal. If the donor simply chooses not to 
opt-in to the gift, then they will remember their actions exactly as if no gift was offered, and the self-
signaling value should not be any different. For this second reason, Benabou and Tirole’s model would 
predict that neither type of gift should cause crowding out, especially if donors refuse the item (which 
almost all do). 
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 It could be that the gift offer provides information to the donor. For instance, it could imply that 
the non-profit is not really in need of donations. This seems unlikely simply because most donors should 
understand that the gift is meant to induce donations, and not because the non-profit is flush with 
resources. In addition, it seems unlikely to assume that many donors give based purely according to which 
organization they deem to require the funds the most; most give because they enjoy the programming and 
would like to support it. Finally, most of these donors listen to the station regularly and almost certainly 
have heard the on-air advertisements for thank-you gifts. Thus, they should not be surprised by the gift 
offer in the mailer, and the offer should not be providing any new information to the donor regarding the 
degree to which the station needs funds. 
 Perhaps the effect is instead driven by including a glossy, colored insert in the mailer, and the 
content of the insert does not matter. For instance, if donors saw the insert and assumed it was an 
advertisement, they may be more likely to throw the mailer away without reading any further, leading to 
the observed effects. However, the envelope contains the radio station’s logo on the outside, so donors 
should have some knowledge about the likely contents of the mailer, especially since these are donors 
who have given in the past and have received these mailers previously. In addition, the negative gift 
effects occur even among those that have donated by mail in the past, which represent the donors most 
likely to recognize the envelopes and mailers for what they are. 
 Some could posit a reference effect to explain the observed behavior. Donors in gift treatments 
may view $180 as an important reference point, since that is the amount required to qualify for the gift. 
However, the most likely reference points in all treatments would be the suggested donation amounts, 
which are the same across treatments. In addition, those that choose to donate are no more likely to give 
at or above the threshold in treatment vs. control conditions; this suggests that, conditional on choosing to 
donate, the threshold is not affecting how much donors choose to donate. In addition, the vast majority of 
those that give at or above the threshold are not even opting for the gift, suggesting that the gift is not 
likely to cause donors to commit to the threshold as an important reference point. These all suggest 
against a reference effect. 
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 Instead, the negative effect of gifts is likely due to an attention and saliency mechanism. The 
colored insert mentions the gift item and the minimum required donation to receive it, but makes no 
mention of any intrinsic reason to donate (such as supporting your favorite programs). This causes people 
to shift their attention away from their intrinsic motivation for donating and toward the economic 
incentive being advertised. This can reduce the amount of weight that donors put on the intrinsic incentive 
when choosing whether to donate, while simultaneously increasing the weight placed on the economic 
incentive. In addition, this shift in attention can also cause donors to use  a less pro-social and more cost-
benefit mindset (Gneezy et al. 2014; Savary and Newman 2014); a cost-benefit approach would reduce 
donations in this context, since neither gift represents good economic value at the $180 threshold. 
 In some respects, this is the reverse to fundraising strategies that ask you to purchase an item for a 
high price, but where proceeds of the sale go to charity. Such a strategy explicitly calls attention to the 
intrinsic incentive to give, so that despite the economic incentive involved (the item being purchased), 
donation rates increase significantly relative to direct solicitation requests (Koppel and Shulze 2009; 
Newman and Savary 2014). In the next section, I test this mechanism more directly. 
 
V. Mechanical Turk Experiment 
 
Procedure 
 To directly test the role of attention and mindset in crowding out, I designed a 30-minute survey 
for Mechanical Turk workers to fill out. At the end of the survey I gave workers the opportunity to donate 
a portion of their earnings to charity. Subjects were paid $1.50 for the survey, and they were able to earn 
an additional $1.00 to $1.40 bonus from playing various social preference games within the survey. They 
were then asked whether they would like to donate $1 of that bonus to charity. Some subjects would be 
offered a conditional thank-you gift contingent on donating; of these, some were offered the gift up front 
and in a cost-benefit frame, while others were offered the gift in a more pro-social and less salient way. 
The exact language used is displayed in Figure 7. 
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 The survey required workers to finish several tasks before choosing whether to donate. These 
tasks included asking subjects to play a short series of fairness, trust, and reciprocity games. These are 
games derived from Charness and Rabin (2002). Subjects earned from $1.00 to $1.40 on these games, 
depending on their choices and those of a randomly selected partner (the partner being another survey 
taker, chosen at random after the survey is submitted). These tasks measured whether attitudes toward 
thank-you gifts are correlated with adherence to any of these particular norms. Importantly, these games 
also provided a source of income that the worker can choose to donate to charity.15  
 After subjects finished these games, the survey asked subjects if they would like to donate $1 of 
their bonus to a charity. Subjects were informed that they earned at least $1 in bonus, but they were not 
told the exact amount they earned (thus all subjects were operating off of the same information about their 
pay). The charity options were the Red Cross, the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the United Way, and 
the American Cancer Society. In the control treatment, no incentives were offered for donating. The swag 
treatment offered donors a $0.10 Amazon promotional code if they donated $1, while the meals treatment 
offered a $0.10 donation to Feeding America (a national food bank organization) for the same $1 
donation. I chose $0.10 because it sets the gift-to-donation ratio at 10%, which is similar to the ratio 
offered by the radio station. 
 
Results 
 Figure 8 displays the summary statistics for when the less salient and pro-social framing was 
used. There was no difference in donation rates between control, swag, and meals conditions. There was 
also no difference in response to gifts across any measure of donor heterogeneity, including donor 
responses to the social games portion of the survey. 
 Figure 9 displays the same statistics for when gifts are framed more prominently, as in the mailer 
solicitation. I find that the meals condition reduced donation rates 33% relative to controls, suggesting 
                                                            
15 Due to the Mechanical Turk setup, I cannot ask subjects to donate any portion of their $1.50 fee for taking the 
survey. Thus it has to be donated from their worker bonus, which is earned through these games. 
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crowding out. However, this is still only significant at the p<0.067 threshold. The results improve slightly 
when excluding subjects that took the survey too fast or too slow (<5 minutes or >90 minutes), but results 
are still only marginally significant. Nonetheless, this suggests that attention and mindset can change 
whether crowding out occurs. 
 It is unclear why this re-framing matters for the meals condition but not the swag condition. Most 
likely, the value of the swag simply is of equal or greater magnitude than any decrease in utility that 
might result from crowding out. Also note that donors request the gift much more frequently than they did 
in the radio station campaigns; this may be because the gift is provided by the experimenter, and not at the 
expense of the non-profit they are donating to. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
 This study demonstrates that intrinsic and extrinsic incentives can interact in a fundraising setting. 
Introducing extrinsic incentives can crowd out a prospective donor’s intrinsic motives for supporting a 
non-profit. In the direct-mail tests, conditional gifts decreased giving rates by over 30% relative to 
controls, leading to a potential 15% decrease in funds. This is despite the fact these gifts are always opt-in 
only, and that donors almost never opted for the gift anyways, even if they were eligible for them. 
 This evidence is not consistent with the self-image or self-signaling interpretation of crowding 
out in Benabou and Tirole (2006). In this field experiment, donors could maintain the self-signaling value 
of their donation by simply refusing the gift. They could then still interpret their act of donating as a 
charitable act not confounded by any extrinsic incentives. In addition, the meals gift is pro-social in nature 
and also should not decrease the self-signal value of a donation. For these reasons, self-image is unlikely 
to be the driving force behind the observed negative gift effects. 
 Instead, crowding out likely occurred because the direct-mail inserts caused prospective donors to 
shift attention away from their intrinsic motives and toward the utility value of the gift. This shift can also 
cause donors to change their mindset toward their donation; a conditional gift offer may cause donors to 
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adopt a cost-benefit or exchange mindset toward the donation, instead of a pro-social mindset. Such an 
interpretation is also consistent with the Mechanical Turk results; changes in framing that increased gift 
saliency and cost-benefit mindsets marginally increased crowding out. Stronger changes, such as 
emphasizing the item more prominently, could result in even more crowding out.  
 Additionally, these effects were driven primarily by a specific type of donor. Only those that had 
never accepted a gift in the past were negatively affected by the gift offer. Just as importantly, those that 
had accepted gifts in the past did not respond positively to the gift offer. This lack of positive response is 
not because donors already have the item, since donors that accepted the meals gift in the past should still 
be interested in providing another set of meals to the food bank. Altogether, these results suggest that 
gifts for these particular fundraising campaigns have not benefited the non-profit.  
 Importantly, this does not suggest that extrinsic incentives should never be used in a fundraising 
context. Instead, it suggests that any extrinsic incentive that is introduced must have sufficient value and 
desirability to overcome a possible endogenous reduction in intrinsic incentives. In some cases, the 
extrinsic incentive may be enough to overcome any crowding out. This may be what occurred in field 
experiments that offered pay for blood donations (Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim 2014). 
 More generally, these results emphasize that non-profit organizations must carefully consider the 
psychological incentives that their donors face. While conditional incentives might make sense in a 
standard for-profit marketing perspective, they carry much different implications in a non-profit setting. 
Non-profit organizations can better optimize their fundraising strategies by being more cognizant of the 
psychological incentives that are particular to the contexts in which they operate. 
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Table 1: Classification of Renewal Call Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Buck-slips for Direct-Mail Renewal Testing (Glossy and Colored) 
 
 
  
Categorization Name Months until Renewal Months since Last Donation 
R1 3 9 
R2 2 10 
R3 1 11 
R4 0 12 
R5 Overdue (by 1 month) 13 
R6 Overdue (by 2 months) 14 
R7 Overdue (by 3 months) 15 
Note: Name 
and images 
redacted. 
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Figure 2A: Solicitations by Month and Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2B: Solicitations by Month and Renewal-Status 
  
   Pieces of Mail  
Month  Control  Swag  Meals  
May-14  3,080  1,942  1,778  
Jun-14  2,746  1,851  1,972  
Jul-14  2,337  1,992  1,938  
Total  8,163  5,785  5,688  
Renewal Status  May  June  July  Total  
R1 – 1st notice  426  616  2,597  3,641  
R2  847  383  578  1,808  
R3  1,513  806  344  2,663  
R4  528  1,302  685  2,515  
R5  799  454  1,096  2,349  
R6  2,407  701  351  3,459  
R7  278  2,307  616  3,201  
Total  6,800  6,569  6,267  19,636  
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Figure 3: Subject Traits, by Treatment Assignment 
Variable Total Obs^ 
(out of 10013) 
Control Meals Swag 
Demographics     
     Male 
 
8807 47% 47% 47% 
     Caucasian 
 
8194 74% 72% 72% 
     Age 
 
7381 58 (15) 56 (15) 54 (16) 
Pledge History From 2013     
     Months from Last Pledge (from Jul-14) 
 
- 13.0 (2.7) 12.3 (2.8) 12.5 (2.9) 
     Pledges per Donor in 2013 
 
- 0.83 0.83 0.86 
     Total Pledged per Donor in 2013 
 
- $ 65.6 (81.6) $ 59.1 (73.6) $ 59.2 (76.2) 
Donation Methods Used in 2013     
     Mail 
 
- 4.8% 2.9% 2.7% 
     Web 
 
- 27.4% 34.1% 35.4% 
     Telemarketing 
 
- 13.0% 10.8% 8.3% 
^This column represents the number of successful merges (based on name) with the dataset providing that particular 
demographic variable. 8,807 of the 10,013 donor names matched the U.S. Census’ database on first-names and gender 
probabilities; 8,194 matched the U.S. Census data on last-names and race probabilities. 7,381 matched the purchased third-party 
consumer behavior data providing ages (matched donors based on name and address). 
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Figure 4: Donation Rates (May donors and/or R1 donors) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Condition 1 Condition 2 T-statistic P-value (2-tail) 
Control Swag  3.508 0.001*** 
Control Meals  3.529 0.000*** 
Meals Swag -0.097      0.923   
6.2% 
257 donors 
4139 solicited 
 
 
 
4.2% 
121 donors 
2838 solicited 
 
 
 
4.3% 
131 donors 
3036 solicited 
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Table 2: Likelihood of Donating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification OLS OLS Logit Penalized 
Likelihood Logit 
 
Dep. Var. Chose to Donate Chose to Donate Chose to Donate Chose to Donate 
N 10,013 10,013 10,013 10,013 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
     
Any Gift Offered 
 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
   
        Swag Offered  -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.339*** 
(0.111) 
-0.338*** 
(0.110) 
        Meals Offered 
 
 
 -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.349*** 
(0.114) 
-0.347*** 
(0.113) 
Constant 
 
 
0.066*** 
(0.004) 
0.066*** 
(0.004) 
-2.641*** 
(0.067) 
-2.639*** 
(0.068) 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
  All SEs are Huber-White robust except Model (4). 
  *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 5: Average Conditional Donations 
  
Condition 1 Condition 2 T-statistic P-value (2-tail) 
Control Swag  1.131 0.259 
Control Meals  1.220 0.223 
Meals Swag -0.130 0.897 
$107 Average 
257 Donations 
24 $180+ (9%) 
0 Gifts Accepted 
 
 
$94 Average 
121 Donations 
10 $180+ (8%) 
4 Gifts Accepted 
 
 
$96 Average 
131 Donations 
13 $180+ (10%) 
1 Gift Accepted 
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Table 3: Pledge Amounts (Conditional on Donating) 
 
 (5) (6) 
DV Conditional Pledge Amount {0,1}: 1 = Pledge ≥ $180 
 
Specification OLS OLS 
N 509 509 
R2 0.006 0.001 
Swag Offered -10.478 
(9.713) 
0.029 
(0.038) 
 
Meals Offered -13.063 
(10.357) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
 
Constant 106.902*** 
(6.540) 
0.130*** 
(0.023) 
 
Month Fixed Effects YES YES 
               All SEs are Huber-White robust.  
              *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Figure 6: Donation Rates by Treatment and Renewal-Month Status 
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Table 4A: Likelihood of Donating by Renewal-Cycle 
All SEs are Huber-White robust. *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
^Since individuals who declined to donate in May were not included in the June and July data, all R2-R7 donors in 
the sample are from May. Results are similar if all data, including R2-R7 donors in June and July, are included. 
#The interactions represent the incremental effect of each treatment – renewal month pair beyond the main treatment 
effect. The net effect of treatment for each treatment-renewal month pair is the linear combination each interaction 
term with the relevant main effect (as seen below in Table 4B). 
 
Table 4B: Joint Significance Tests for Model (10) 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 
Swag -0.027*** -0.006 -0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.011** 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Meals -0.032*** 0.002 -0.016 0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
OLS (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Renewal Months All All R1 R2-R7 
N 19,636 19,636 3,641 15,995 
R2 0.015 0.013 0.023 0.004 
Main Effects     
        Swag Offered -0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
        Meals Offered -0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
Interactions#     
        Swag*R2 
 
 0.020 
(0.017) 
  
        Swag*R3 
 
 0.017 
(0.015) 
  
        Swag*R4 
 
 0.032** 
(0.014) 
  
        Swag*R5 
 
 0.032*** 
(0.012) 
  
        Swag*R6 
 
 0.015 
(0.010) 
  
        Swag*R7 
 
 0.035*** 
(0.011) 
  
        Meals*R2 
 
 0.034** 
(0.017) 
  
        Meals*R3  0.016 
(0.015) 
  
        Meals*R4  0.033** 
(0.013) 
  
        Meals*R5 
 
 0.040*** 
(0.012) 
  
        Meals*R6 
 
 0.030*** 
(0.011) 
  
        Meals*R7 
 
 0.027*** 
(0.010) 
  
Constant 
 
0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.097*** 
(0.008) 
0.131*** 
(0.016) 
0.086*** 
(0.010) 
Renewal-Month Status FE YES YES NO YES 
Month FE YES YES YES NO^ 
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Table 5: Likelihood of Donating, by Past Donation Method (OLS) 
DV = Chose to Donate (11) (12) (13) 
N 10013 8194 7476 
R2 0.027 0.027 0.036 
Treatment    
     Swag Offered -0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
     Meals Offered -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
Relevant Donor-Level Traits    
     Gave by Mail in 2013 
 
0.086*** 
(0.026) 
  
     White^ 
 
 0.057*** 
(0.011) 
 
     Age(Normalized) 
 
  0.165*** 
(0.026) 
Interactions    
     Swag * Mail-in-2013 
 
-0.052 
(0.042) 
  
     Meals * Mail-in-2013 
 
-0.080** 
(0.037) 
  
     Swag * White 
    
 -0.033** 
(0.015) 
 
     Meals * White 
 
 -0.038** 
(0.016) 
 
     Swag * Age(Normalized) 
 
  0.014 
(0.037) 
     Meals * Age(Normalized) 
 
 
  0.003 
(0.038) 
Constant 0.120*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.086*** 
(0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
Renewal-Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Linear Combinations of Coefficients    
Swag + Swag*Mail 
 
-0.064 
(0.042) 
  
Meals + Meals*Mail 
 
-0.095*** 
(0.037) 
  
Swag + Swag*White 
 
 -0.028*** 
(0.008) 
 
Meals + Meals*White 
 
 -0.028*** 
(0.008) 
 
Swag + Swag* Age(Normalized)   0.009 
(0.020) 
Meals + Meals* Age(Normalized) 
 
  0.001 
(0.020) 
             All SEs are Huber-White robust. *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
             ^White is a continuous variable between 0 and 1. 
            #Age(Normalized)  is simply the donor’s age, normalized to a scale between 0 and 1. 
132 
 
 
 
Table 6: Direct-Mail Renewals with Archival Data 
DV = {0,1}: 1 = donated (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Population Accepted Gift Previously Never Accepted Gift Accepted Gift Previously Never Accepted Gift
N 4554 5459 4554 5459 
R2 0.021 0.029 0.032 0.032 
Treatment     
     Swag Offered -0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
     Meals Offered -0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.027** 
(0.011) 
Past Donation Methods     
     Gave by Web in the Past   -0.060*** 
(0.010) 
-0.028*** 
(0.011) 
Interactions     
     Swag * Gave by Web in Past   0.037** 
(0.017) 
0.023* 
(0.014) 
     Meals * Gave by Web in Past   0.007 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
     
Constant 0.114*** 
(0.020) 
0.143*** 
(0.027) 
0.114*** 
(0.020) 
0.143*** 
(0.027) 
     
Renewal-Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Linear Combinations of Coefficients     
     Swag + Swag*Gave by Web   -0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
     Meals + Meals*Gave by Web   -0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
 All SEs are Huber-White robust.  
 Results are similar when using logit specifications. 
 *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 7: Mechanical Turk Experiment, Donation Requests 
 
 
Less Salient and more Prosocial Frame, Swag: 
 
Would you like to donate $1 of your earnings to one of the national charities below? If 
you do, we will deduct this from your earnings and make the donation on your behalf. 
We will also send you a confirmation message through mTurk messaging. In addition, as 
a thank-you for your donation, we will send you a $0.10 Amazon promotional code 
through mTurk messaging. 
 
 
Less Salient and more Prosocial Frame, Meals: 
 
Would you like to donate $1 of your earnings to one of the national charities below? If 
you do, we will deduct this from your earnings and make the donation on your behalf. 
We will also send you a confirmation message through mTurk messaging. In addition, as 
a thank-you for your donation, we will make a $0.10 contribution to Feeding America, a 
national food bank organization. 
 
 
More Salient and Cost-Benefit Frame, Swag: 
 
Earn an additional $0.10 Amazon promotional code by donating $1 of your earnings to 
one of the national charities below. If you do, we will deduct this from your earnings and 
make the donation on your behalf. We will also send you a confirmation message through 
mTurk messaging that contains the promotional code. 
 
 
More Salient and Cost-Benefit Frame, Meals: 
 
In addition, you can earn a $0.10 donation for Feeding America, a national food bank 
organization, if you donate $1 of your earnings to one of the national charities below. If 
you do, we will deduct this from your earnings and make the donation on your behalf. 
We will also send you a confirmation message through mTurk messaging. 
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Figure 8: Mechanical Turk Donations, Telemarketing Language 
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mTurk Survey - Telemarketing Language
Treatment Subjects Number of Donors % Donating Gifts Given 
Control 69 11 15.9% N/A 
Swag 69 13 18.8% 10 
Meals 70 13 18.6% 9 
Condition 1 Condition 2 T-statistic P-value (2-tail) P-value (1-tail) 
Control Swag -0.446 0.656 0.672 
Control Meals -0.407 0.684 0.658 
Meals Swag 0.040 0.968 0.516 
     1-tail test conforms with ex-ante hypotheses that Pr (Condition 2 < Condition 1) 
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Figure 9: Mechanical Turk Donations, Mailer Language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 minutes < Completion Time < 90 minutes only 
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mTurk Survey - Mailer Language
Treatment Subjects Number of Donors % Donating Gifts Given 
Control 140 30 21.4% N/A 
Swag 122 27 22.1% 17 
Meals 138 20 14.5% 18 
Condition 1 Condition 2 T-statistic P-value (2-tail) P-value (1-tail) 
Control Swag -0.137 0.891 0.554 
Control Meals 1.506 0.133 0.067* 
Swag Meals -1.599 0.111 0.933 
     
Condition 1 Condition 2 T-statistic P-value (2-tail) P-value (1-tail) 
Control Swag 0.075 0.934 0.470 
Control Meals 1.506 0.106 0.053* 
Swag Meals -1.599 0.134 0.933 
     
1-tail test conforms with ex-ante hypotheses that Pr (Condition 2 < Condition 1) 
1-tail test conforms with ex-ante hypotheses that Pr (Condition 2 < Condition 1) 
136 
 
A P P E N D I X  A  
INSTRUCTIONS TO CHAPTER I 
[Instructions shown are for Standard sessions. Self-image sessions used identical 
instructions, but also added the italicized text shown at the end of some pages.] 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating. At this point, please don’t talk to any other 
participants and please turn off all cell phones and electronics. If you haven’t yet, please 
remove all personal materials from your desk (you may place them underneath your seat). 
 
If at any point you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to your seat to 
answer your question in private. This will avoid delaying the experiment or disrupting others’ 
during a task.  
 
Today’s session is a study on individual judgment and decision-making. Over the course of the 
experiment, you will make choices in a series of tasks, and these choices may impact your 
earnings as well as the earnings of others. In this particular study, you may also earn various 
items. If earned, these items will be handed out, along with your monetary earnings, at the end 
of the experiment by the lab manager. 
 
For today, the items you can earn in this experiment are: a duffel bag, a pen, and/or an 
additional $2 in cash. 
 
There is no deception or dishonesty in this experiment. It is an anonymous experiment; your 
name will not be used in any way by the researchers conducting this study.  
 
You have a set of handouts in front of you. Please do not flip through these until you are 
instructed to do so. In addition, please do not mark up your handouts, and do not take them 
with you when you leave. They will be re-used for future sessions. 
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General Instructions: Section 1 
 
In Section 1 of this experiment, the computer will randomly assign you to one of two roles: role 
0 or role 1. You will retain this designation throughout Section 1. 
 
The computer will randomly pair you with one other participant. If you are a role 0, you will be 
paired with a role 1. If you are a role 1, you will be paired with a role 0. You will remain 
anonymous to one another. Each role will have different responsibilities. These responsibilities 
will vary as we progress through the experiment, although role 0 will always be designated the 
primary decision-maker. As the experiment progresses, you will also be re-matched with a new, 
random partner for each task; that random partner will always be of a different role than you. 
 
Please click “OK” on your screen to learn your role assignment. 
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Section 1 Continued 
 
In this part of Section 1, for each pair of people, the computer will give either person an item 
with probability ¾. With probability ¼, neither person will receive an item. If you receive an 
item, you will see a picture of the item on your screen. If you received an item, it means your 
partner did not.  
 
If you did not receive an item, the computer may or may not announce whether your partner 
received an item and what that item is. If you received an item, the computer will tell you 
whether your partner is aware that you received an item. 
 
Following this, the role 0 person will be designated the primary decision-maker in the pair. He 
or she will be given $10. Role 0 must then choose how much of the $10 to give to their role 1 
partner. The amount that role 0 keeps will be his or her earnings for this part of the experiment 
(plus any item that they received). The amount that role 0 gives to role 1 will be role 1’s 
earnings for this part of the experiment (plus any item that they received). 
 
You will repeat this task for 8 rounds; each round will be with a new, randomly matched person 
of the proper role type. At the end of the experiment, one of these rounds will be selected for 
payment. Items and cash earned in the selected round will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
[Self-Image Sessions Only] 
At the end of the entire experiment, if you are a role 0, we will tell you how your individual 
choices compare to past participants that were role 0 in previous sessions. For instance, you will 
see the average amount you gave to your partner in rounds where you did not receive an item 
from the computer, accompanied with a percentile rank that compares what you gave to what 
past participants gave in the same scenario.  
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Section 1 Continued 
 
 
In this part of Section 1, for each pair of people, the computer will give role 1 people an item 
with probability ¾. With probability ¼, neither person will receive an item. If you receive an 
item, you will see a picture of the item on your screen. Your partner will not know whether you 
received an item. 
 
If an item was given to Role 1, he or she may choose to keep this item or instead give it to their 
role 0 partner by clicking the “Give” button. If this is chosen, the picture of the item will 
disappear from role 1’s screen and will show up on role 0’s screen.  
 
Following this, the role 0 person will be designated the primary decision-maker in the pair. He 
or she will be given $10. Role 0 must then choose how much of the $10 to give to their role 1 
partner. The amount that role 0 keeps will be his or her earnings for this part of the experiment 
(plus any item that they received). The amount that role 0 gives to role 1 will be role 1’s 
earnings for this part of the experiment (plus any item that they kept). 
 
Note to role 0s: If a role 0 does not receive a gift, it may be because role 1 did not receive an 
item from the computer this round. In addition, role 1s receive at most only one item per 
round, and they can only give the item that they received that round. 
 
You will repeat this task for 8 rounds; each round will be with a new, randomly matched person 
of the proper role type. At the end of the experiment, one of these rounds will be selected for 
payment. Items and cash earned in the selected round will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
[Self-Image Sessions Only] 
At the end of the entire experiment, if you are a role 0, we will tell you how your individual 
choices compare to past participants that were role 0 in previous sessions. For instance, you will 
see the average amount you gave to your partner in rounds where you did not receive an item 
from your partner, accompanied with a percentile rank that compares what you gave to what 
past participants gave in the same scenario.  Likewise, we will also report average amounts you 
gave in response to other actions by your partner, accompanied by a similar percentile rank. 
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Section 1 Continued 
 
In this part of Section 1, for each pair of people, the computer will give role 1 people an item 
with probability ¾. With probability ¼, neither person will receive an item. If you receive an 
item, you will see a picture of the item on your screen. Your partner will not know whether you 
received an item. 
 
If an item was given to Role 1, he or she may choose to keep this item or instead gift it to their 
role 0 partner by clicking the “Give” button. However, if “Give” is chosen, the computer will 
override this choice with probability ½ and force role 0 to keep the item. If the computer 
overrides the choice, it will be announced to both players that a gift was attempted but 
overridden by the computer. If the computer instead allows the item to be given, then the 
picture of the item will disappear from role 0’s screen and appear on role 1’s screen. 
 
Following this, the role 0 person will be designated the primary decision-maker in the pair. He 
or she will be given $10. Role 0 must then choose how much of the $10 to give to their role 1 
partner. The amount that role 0 keeps will be his or her earnings for this part of the experiment 
(plus any item that they received). The amount that role 0 gives to role 1 will be role 1’s 
earnings for this part of the experiment (plus any item that they kept). 
 
Note to role 0s: If a role 0 does not receive a gift, it may be because role 1 did not receive an 
item from the computer this round. In addition, role 1s receive at most only one item per 
round, and they can only give the item that they received that round. 
 
You will repeat this task for 8 rounds; each round will be with a new, randomly matched person 
of the proper role type. At the end of the experiment, one of these rounds will be selected for 
payment. Items and cash earned in the selected round will be paid to you at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
[Self-Image Sessions Only] 
At the end of the entire experiment, if you are a role 0, we will tell you how your individual 
choices compare to past participants that were role 0 in previous sessions. For instance, you will 
see the average amount you gave to your partner in rounds where you did not receive an item 
from your partner, accompanied with a percentile rank that compares what you gave to what 
past participants gave in the same scenario.  Likewise, we will also report average amounts you 
gave in response to other actions by your partner, accompanied by a similar percentile rank. 
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Section 2: General Instructions 
 
In Section 2, you will answer a series of questions about yourself. Most of these will be multiple 
choice questions, but several will also require open text responses. Please respond carefully 
and truthfully. When you finish the questionnaire, the computer will randomly select three 
rounds from Section 1 to determine your pay for the experiment. You must finish the 
questionnaire to be paid in full. 
 
Note: When typing your responses to the open-ended text questions, please make sure to hit 
the “ENTER” key when you are done typing. Otherwise, the computer will not record your 
response. Upon hitting “ENTER,” the text that you entered should disappear; this confirms that 
your response was recorded by the computer. 
 
[Self-Image Sessions Only] 
At the end of the experiment, all role 0’s will also see three successive screens that report their 
average allocations to their partner in different scenarios, as well as how their individual choices 
compare with role 0 choices from past sessions. 
 
When you are finished with the questionnaire, please wait patiently at your seat. When all 
subjects are finished, I will dismiss you. To get paid, please bring the slip of paper that lists your 
computer number; it is included in your handouts. Your lab manager will pay you based upon 
the ID number of your computer. 
 
 
